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ABSTRACT:
This thesis addresses the financial cost implications incurred during elections, with
special focus on South Africa. The discussion is conducted by way of comparing
South Africa to countries like India, Australia, Israel and Mexico.
Democracy entails more than merely conducting periodic elections that are free and
fair, but it cannot be less. To a large extent free and fair elections are indicative of the
governing authority's commitment to democracy. This commitment however, does
have financial implications. A question that is very rarely addressed relates to the
financial cost implications that accompany this commitment. For a country such as
South Africa with a range of other pressing socio-economic issues, the cost factor
with regard to the voting process is of vital importance.
The South African electoral experience, in comparison to that of other developing
countries, is presently a very costly undertaking at a conservative average cost of
more than US $13.00 per vote. Depending on how the expenses are calculated, this
figure takes on hefty proportions.
To an extent the tardiness on the part of the South African Government in appointing
the Electoral Commission to conduct the 1999 elections and the subsequent conflicts
regarding the budgetary allocations to the Electoral Commission (EC) combined with
poor electoral planning, resulted in the EC having to resort to very expensive
technology in order to ensure that a free and fair election would be conducted on the
date set by the President.
Apart from addressing the above mentioned issues, relating to the cost expenditure
during elections, the assignment also addresses possible ways to reduce these costs
incurred.
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ABSTRAK:
Hierdie tesis fokus op die finansiële uitgawes wat tydens verkiesings aangegaan word,
met spesifieke verwysing na Suid-Afrika. Die bespreking geskied aan die hand van 'n
vergelyking met lande soos Indië, Australië, Israel en Mexico.
Demokrasie behels baie meer as net die hou van periodieke vrye en regverdige
verkiesings, maar dit kan ook nie enigiets minder as dit behels nie. Vrye en
regverdige verkiesings is tot 'n groot mate 'n bewys van 'n bepaalde regime se
verbintenis tot die demokrasie. Hierdie verbintenis het egter finansiële implikasies vir
'n land. Die finansiële koste verbonde aan hierdie "verbintenis" is egter selde 'n punt
van akademiese bespreking. Met die aantal sosio-ekonomiese vraagstukke waarmee
die Suid-Afrikaanse regering op die oomblik gekonfronteeer word, is dit van
kardinale belang dat dringende aandag geskenk word aan pogings om die koste-faktor
van die verkiesingsproses so laag as moontlik te hou.
In vergelyking met die gemiddelde koste wat verbonde is aan verkiesings in ander
ontwikkelende lande, was die 1999 Suid-Afrikaanse verkiesing (teen sowat US
$13,00 per kieser) 'n duur onderneming en afhangende van hoe die kostes bereken
word, ontaard hierdie bedrag in 'n aardige een.
Tot 'n groot mate was swak verkiesingsbeplanning die oorsaak dat daar tot duur
tegnologie gewend moes om te verseker dat die verkiesing vry en regverdig verloop,
soos op die datum wat deur die President bepaal is. Die laat aanwysing van die 1999
Verkiesingskommissie en die daaropvolgende konflik oor die verkiesingsbegroting,
het ook bygedra tot die feit dat duur tegnologie ingespan moes word.
Afgesien van bogenoemde aspekte, bespreek die tesis ook moontlike maniere om
toekomstige verkiesings in Suid-Afrika teen 'n laer koste te hou.
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CHAPTER1
Background to the Elections and Problem Statement
1.1 INTRODUCTION
27 April 1994 marked the official beginning of a new chapter in the political history of
South Africa, a chapter which was heralded by the appointment of F.W. De Klerk as
State President in 1989. lts inability to sustain the financial costs of apartheid,
together with an increase in internal political resistance from the black populace,
caused the government to yield to black demands for political equality. Eventually in
February 1990 the path was cleared for a democratic settlement accompanied by
amongst others the release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of Black resistance
movements (Kotzé, 2000: 79-81).
The 1994 national elections conjure memories up of a resurgence in political violence
in the run-up to the elections, and for the symbolism attached to the elections. After
years of struggling for political, social and economic emancipation, South Africa's
black population shrugged off the yoke of a political system based on racial
segregation and white superiority, which stripped many of them of their dignity and
self esteem.
These elections coincided with, what Huntington (1997:4) calls, "the Third Wave of
Democracy". This "third wave" of democracy was initiated in Portugal in 1974; the
scale and pace of which surpassed that of the previous two waves. The first long
wave of democracy started in the early 19th century and by 1920 there were 30
democracies in the world. By 1942, the number was reduced to about half a dozen
because of the rise of fascist and authoritarian regimes. Following World War II, the
second short wave of democracy increased the number of democratic regimes in the
world to just over 30, but this too was followed by the collapse of democracy in many
of these countries as they were taken over by Communist regimes. The third wave, as
posited earlier, brought about another increase in the number of democratic states in
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2the world. According to Pastor (1999:4), in 1990 there were 59 democratic states in
the world and by 1999 there were 117 states that were classified democracies.
Five years after the first post-Apartheid elections, on 2 June 1999, South Africans
voted in the country's second national democratic elections. These were described as
free and fair by some domestic and international observers. The group of observers
sent by the Commonwealth, however, refrained from using the terms "free" and "fair"
to describe the elections. They chose to describe the elections as "sufficiently
expressing the will of the South African people". To what extent their assessment
clouded the credibility of the final results, was in any event a debatable issue. (For a
detailed discussion see Hofmeyr, 2000 )
The South African electoral process, like most other processes of this nature,
consisted of at least three electoral phases or stages: (1) the pre-election period which
included preparatory work on the registration list, the campaign, access to the media,
and the use of State resources; (2) the election period, consisting of the voting on
election day and the subsequent vote count; and, (3) the post-election period,
comprising of ballot recounts and adjudication of complaints (Pastor, 1998: 159; Choe
and Darno If, 1999). During the first phase some scholarly concern was raised with
regard to the financial cost of the elections (see Sulcas, 1999 and Lodge, 1999: 18-19).
According to Barrell in the Daily Mail & Guardian (March 5, 1999) "By the time the
ballots have all been counted ... more than Rl 000 will have been spent on each voter."
Both Sulcas (The Sunday Independent, 6 June 1999) and Lodge (1999) articulated the
notion that too much money was being spent on the South African elections,
speculating that by the time the final ballot was counted, the EC was expected to have
spent more than R1.35 billion over two years. Although accurate to a certain degree
in their contention, Lodge and Suicas seem to fail to realise that an election, apart
from being an instrument through which the ruling elite reasserts and legitimises its
positions of power, is also an instrument of job creation (even though it is temporary
in nature) and contributes to infrastructural investment (which in itself poses long
term cost-saving benefits).
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3Even when taking into account the cost of the elections held in other states, including
for instance India, Australia, Israel and Mexico, it would be premature to assert that
the financial cost of the South African elections compares unfavourably with those of
'. the above mentioned states. The cost of the South African electoral experience
includes the "indirect" cost calculations (as set out in the following chapters)
associated with electoral expenditure.
The aim of the comparison is to put the South African election expenditure in a
broader global context and it furthermore allows for an objective judgement as to the
manner in which the elections were administered. It should also be borne in mind
that country-specific differences (i.e. population density, relative currency values,
topography, etc.) trivialise many good comparisons. When dealing with electoral
expenses, this factor plays quite a significant role in any comparative deduction that
could be drawn in this regard.
As the literature suggests, the cost of conducting elections is influenced by three major
capacity-building factors: (a) a country's experience regarding democratic elections;
(b) whether or not the elections are part of a peacekeeping process; and (c) the
introduction of sophisticated technology (Lopez-Pintor, 1999 and Reynold and Reily,
1997). It is only fair to mention that the calculated cost of the South African elections,
unlike the costs associated with the electoral experience in Australia, India, Israel and
Mexico, includes the "indirect" expenses incurred before and during the elections. In
addition there are other factors influencing electoral expenses, eg. population density,
literacy levels of the adult population and the relative nature of resource expenses
between countries (i.e. lower fuel prices in developed countries because of the relative
value of currency exchange rates, etc.).
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41.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Without wishing to downplay the pivotal role performed by elections in legitimising a
new regime and the political system; a country such as South Africa simply cannot
afford to overspend on conducting its elections when it is faced with important social
and economic issues. Kaiser Nyatsumba in the Cape Times (June 9, 1999) also
expresses this sentiment and uses this as a warning to those in power when he
emphasises that "the impoverished masses will not be patient forever." The normative
question that needs to be raised is whether or not democracy and the concomitant
liberties it extends to the ordinary citizenry can ever be expressed in monetary terms.
Consequently, the main focus of this thesis will be on the financial costs incurred
during the 1999 elections in order to establish whether or not the vast amount of
money that was spent could in fact be justified.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the 1999 national elections in South Africa, apart
from the ANC's landslide victory, was the cost incurred in running the elections. The
underlying principle of this contention is that a country faced with various social
problems - a deteriorating health and education system and a spiralling crime rate -
cannot continue spending too much money on elections, as it may prove to be a fatal
error of judgement in the long run (Cape Times, 9 June 1999).
Mattes and Thiel (1998: 108) place the social challenges facing South Africa in a
broader social context in asserting that "in a poor and grossly unequal society, it is
difficult to preach about the value of democracy for realising individual dignity and
freedom." The survival of democracy will be the least of concerns to people whose
basic physiological needs (housing, food, etc.) are not being met. This coincides with
Bratton's (1998:218) view that South Africans, especially Blacks, have an
instrumental view of democracy - associating it with jobs and service delivery - rather
than with the intrinsic guarantees of civil and political freedoms. The costs involved
in running democratic elections in South Africa, therefore, need to be cut dramatically
without sacrificing the legitimacy of the whole process. An area that accounted for
heated debate was political party funding during elections. As Lodge (in Barrell,
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51999:4) commented: "We may have to look at ways of reducing democracy's price tag
in the future ... This is a high cost for a country such as ours." Curbing the expenses
incurred on the funding of political parties may thus prove to be start in this direction.
This study seeks to find explanations for the high cost of the 1999 elections, cognisant
that country-specific differences may render obsolete any good comparisons in the
international arena. The paper concomitantly explores whether or not it is possible to
conduct future elections at a reduced cost.
1.3 PROPOSITIONS
Several different reasons may be posited in order to explain the costs incurred during
the South African election process. In the following paragraphs attention will be
devoted to the different explanations offered to explain the high costs involved in
running democratic elections. These explanations will serve as propositions in this
study. Apart from the administrative cost considerations taken into account by
Reynold and Reily (1997: 115-119), Lopez-Pintor (1999) asserts that the cost of
conducting an election is influenced by two other major capacity-building factors:
(a) a country's experience with democratic elections; and (b) whether or not the
elections are part of a broader peacekeeping process. It should be emphasised that
most literature omits a third capacity-building factor which influences electoral
expenditure, namely the introduction of sophisticated technology to the electoral
process. Automation has proven real long-term cost saving benefits but, if
mismanaged, is able to inflate electoral expenses in the short term.
1.4 AIM AND PURPOSE
This study is not an essay on different electoral systems, or about choosing an ideal
one for South Africa for that matter. The concern of this study is rather the cost
incurred during the 1999 electoral process in South Africa, which will be considered
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6by way of a comparison with other selected democracies, and by examining measures
that may be implemented to curb the costs of future elections.
It is, therefore, the aim of this study - after a comparative analysis of the costs
incurred during the election processes in countries including Israel, Australia, India
and Mexico - to make both suggestions and recommendations as to how the South
African election process could be made more cost-efficient whilst simultaneously
retaining its legitimacy. Specific attention will be paid to certain areas of expenditure,
including overt as well as hidden costs.
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
Although its primary focus is on electoral management bodies, the only study found to
be dealing with the financial costs incurred during the election process is a
comparative study done by Lopez-Pintor (1999) on electoral expenditure and the
factors influencing expenses. However, a country-specific disparity in matters such as
relative currency values vis-a-vis each other, geographical differences, and population
density all influence the relevant cost. Therefore, any analysis that aims to be of any
comparative significance should pay due regard to these variances. Indeed, the failure
of the study by Lopez-Pintor to take these disparities into account, significantly
impairs the comparative value of his study. The study does succeed though in
focusing the attention on a field within the electoral studies literature that is in dire
need of development. As a consequence, it is fair to assert that studies on elections
rarely, if ever, focus on the financial cost incurred by governments in allowing their
electorate to exercise their "democratic right" to elect political representatives to both
provincial and national legislatures.
This study is significant in that its key focus is on both the direct and indirect costs
incurred during the electoral process. As a result, this may serve as a valuable
contribution to the existing body of literature regarding the issue of electoral cost in
democracies. lts implicit aim is the instigation of more in-depth analyses of this
particular feature of electoral studies.
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71.6 DATA COLLECTION
The study is explorative-descriptive in nature, and will primarily utilise books,
newspapers, academic journals, the Internet, official and unofficial publications from
both government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in addition to personal
interviews, as sources of information.
Information with regard to the specific countries in the comparative analysis was
drawn from their respective electoral commissions' websites. Interviews with the
relevant individuals at the lEe and other NGOs were conducted. It is revealing that
much of this data coincides in general with what appeared in the popular press.
1.7 DEFINING ELECTIONS
It has been established that the type of electoral system employed significantly
influences the cost incurred during the election process. Let us now take a closer look
at elections, the type of electoral systems and their importance.
It is not possible for all the citizens of a country to participate directly in the public
decision-making process, as it would not only be too time-consuming but also a very
costly matter. Consequently they elect political representatives to fulfil that function.
In most cases, depending on the performance delivered during his/her time in office, a
representative will be elected again and given the task of decision-making on behalf of
a particular constituency. According to Jones (in Jennings and Zeigler eds. 1966:21),
in theory election time is the period of accounting where the representative is either
instructed by the electorate to continue as their representative or his/her mandate is
terminated. During this time the candidates discuss and clarify issues and make
certain promises to the electorate. As a result elections could be described as issue-
orientated events or processes, which are essential instruments of democracy.
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8Since the Second World War the dominant trend in academic discourse has been to
define democracy almost entirely in terms of elections, overemphasising multiparty
elections as the foundation for democracy (Huntington, 1997:7; Chege, 1995:47).
Democracy is thus viewed as a means of constituting political authority and making it
responsible, by means of which the rulers are selected by vote of the ruled. A modern
nation-state, according to this procedural definition of democracy, has a democratic
political system to the extent that its most powerful decision-makers are selected
through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and where
almost the entire adult population is eligible to vote. Choe and Darnolf (1999), posit
that legitimate elections are also necessary for the consolidation of democracy and that
a failure of their being perceived as legitimate, may threaten the whole process of
democratisation - the transformation from an authoritarian regime to a democratic
one.
LeDuc (1996:305) expresses less certainty in drawing such a direct causal relationship
between elections and the process of government resulting from such an electoral
experience. According to LeDuc (1996:305), "although elections are one of the core
institutions in democratic politics, they may reveal either a little or a lot about the
process of government that flows from them, as illustrated in the cases of Italy and
Japan." The elections that seemed set to revitalise and refashion Italian democracy in
1994 rather led to renewed political instability six months later. The system of
proportional representation resulted in an unstable coalition government. The endless
process of attempting to reconcile opposing views led to internal splits and divisions
within the government, causing it to collapse. Japan, on the other hand, had three
different coalition governments within a year following its 1993 elections. It is
evident from this description that that the linkage between electoral politics and the
actual process of policy making is often quite complicated and indirect (LeDuc in
LeDuc, et al., 1996:307).
More apparent is the fact that democracy and elections are not synonymous concepts.
However, the existence of free, fair and competitive elections is invariably considered
as one of the critical features that define a nation as "democratic" (Bratton, 1998:52),
and they are also necessary requisites for a broader democratic consolidation.
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According to (Pastor, 1998:154), "Democracy is much more than just having the
opportunity to elect public officials, but it cannot be less".
Diamond, too, in his assessment of the procedural definition of democracy, asserts
that there is more to democracy than just elections, and consequently draws the
distinction between liberal democracy and electoral democracy (in Huntington,
1997:7; and Plattner, 1998:171). According to Huntington (1997:7) liberal
democracies are not only characterised by elections. They also have:
(a) restrictions on the power of the executive;
(b) independent judiciaries to uphold the rule of law;
(c) protection for individual rights and liberties; and
(d) a consideration for minority rights.
On the other hand electoral democracies choose governments during reasonably free
and fair elections, but they lack many of the other safeguards for the rights and
liberties that are common in liberal democracies. The importance of elections as part
of the "democracy package" should not be underestimated because, according to
Thakur (1995:220), it is indeed the competition between political parties during
election time that gives practical meaning to democracy.
Even more importantly the majority of the electorate should regard the elections as
legitimate. This is especially the case in a young democracy with a history of deep
racial divisions, such as South Africa. The implication is that the credibility of the
electoral process should not be in doubt, for "electoral credibility is the cornerstone of
representative democracy" (Bailey and Valenzuela, 1998:47). It is this electoral
credibility, according to Bailey and Valenzuela (1998), that will produce " .. .important
immediate effects [like stabilising the political process within the country] and pave
the way for democratic deepening", as opposed to the long term effects produced as a
result of the consolidation of other democratic institutions.
The notion that an election is more than just a singular activity at a particular point in
time is expressed in the works of Dahl (in Harrop and Miller, 1987). Similarly,
Schlemmer and Hirschfeld (in Moller and Hanf, 1995 :2) state that an election "is a
9
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process rather than an event". According to them, it is a process that starts with the
voter education programmes, through to the day the votes are cast, and until the time
the results of the elections are announced. Harrop and Miller (1987:2) express the
same notion with regard to the definition of "elections," as a process rather than a
single event.
However, Heywood (1997:211) have a more limited view of elections, seeing these as
"a device for filling an office or post through choices made by a designated body of
people: the electorate". He does not imply that elections are not a process but a single
event, but rather that the elections are one event and also part of a wider process - a
process which includes amongst others, campaigning and voter education. Heywood
(1997:212) further concedes to the popular view of elections as "a mechanism through
which politicians can be called to account and forced to introduce policies that
somehow reflect public opinion". V.O. Key (in Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge,
1994:7) posits that "unless mass views have some play in the shaping of policy, all the
talk about democracy is nonsense." This view, professed by Key (in Klingemann, et
al. 1994:7), closely coincides more often with the functions of elections rather than the
conceptualisation of the concept itself, but it does, however, provide a more
enlightened idea regarding the notion surrounding elections.
1.8 FUNCTIONS OF ELECTIONS
To some extent the different kinds of elections and the variety of electoral systems
trivialise any generalisation regarding the roles or functions of elections. The
adoption of liberal democratic electoral systems associated with the process of
democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s, however, contributed to identifying the roles
of elections more easily (Heywood, 1997:212). Harrop and Miller (1987) describe
two contrasting views of the function of competitive elections:
1. The conventional view (emphasising the 'bottom-up' functions) whereby elections
are perceived as mechanisms through which public officials could be called to
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account and in some sense be forced to introduce policies that reflect public
opinion. V.O. Kelly expressed this view, stating that: "Elections let voters play the
rational god of vengeance and reward" (in LeDuc et al. 1996:307).
2. In contrast the radical view of elections (emphasising the 'top-down' functions)
perceive elections to be a means through which governments and political elites in
society could exercise control over their populations, making them more
quiescent, malleable and, ultimately, governable.
Heywood (1997 :212) cautions against marginal ising elections to a singular character,
because: "They (elections) are neither simply mechanisms of public accountability nor
a means of ensuring political control. .. (E)lections ... provide the government and the
people ... with the opportunity to influence one another ... "
Probably the most crucial function of elections, according to Reeve and Ware
(1992 :24), is that they have "the symbolic power in legitimising those in [public]
office". Nowhere could this be more true than in the South African case - a country
fraught with a torrid political history of racial oppression and one which is still
battling with growing political intolerance along ethnic and racial lines (Gouws,
1996). It is a country where those in power can, and to a considerable extent will, use
elections to justify particular political and socio-economic interventions. Therefore,
elections are more than mere exercises of the public will. The results are interpreted as
a mandate to make decisions on behalf of and for the people, regardless of the
consequences of such conduct.
This "mandate to make decisions on behalf of the people" more often than not
emerges from the type of electoral system in use.
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1.9 ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
Democracy, according to Lijphart (1994), necessarily means representative democracy
in which elected officials make decisions on behalf of the electorate, the body of
people who voted them into political office. The indispensable task of electing these
representatives is performed by the electoral system.
Electoral systems, according to Krennerich (in Steytler and De Ville eds. 1996:7),
could be regarded as a key element of representative democracies. They influence the
voting behaviour of the electorate, the election results, and they shape political
representation and party systems. Krennerich (1996:7) consequently defines electoral
systems, in the same vein as De Ville and Steytler (1996:1) and Lijphart (1994), as
mechanisms that: " ... determine the rules according to which the voters may express
their political preferences and according to which it is possible to convert the votes
into parliamentary seats".
Any electoral system should comply with five basic requirements or functional
demands, according to De Ville and Steytler (1996: 16-18):
1. Representation: the electoral system should ensure an adequate representation of
minorities and also a fair representation of political parties according to their
votes.
2. Concentration: this relates to the aggregation of social interests and political
opinion in such a way that the political institutions are able to act decisively. The
electoral system should enable the formation of an effective parliament based on a
reduced number of parties and it should allow for the formation of a stable and
effective government based on an absolute parliamentary majority of a party or a
party coalition.
3. Participation: this criterion determines the extent of voter participation and
explores the question of whether or not the voters are in a position to choose
between only political parties or also between individual candidates;
4. Simplicity: the electoral system should not be too complicated for the electorate
and the election administration both to understand and to operate; and lastly
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5. Legitimacy: the members of the political community, the voters and the electorate
should accept the electoral system, the election results and the elected institutions
as legitimate.
No particular electoral system ever fulfils all these demands in an absolute manner.
Some functional demands are satisfied to a larger extent than others, depending on the
electoral system in use. Different functional demands tend to pull the electoral system
in different directions (De Ville and Steytler, 1996: 17). For example, the demand for
increasing the degree of participation within an electoral system, which ensures fair
representation, inevitably leads to a more complicated electoral system. In such a case
the demand for a simple and easily understandable electoral system may not be
satisfied.
The pure proportional representation system complies to the highest possible extent
with the demands for fair representation and simplicity, but in general it fails to satisfy
the demands for concentration and participation. In essence this stresses the need for
multi-functional systems.
According to Krennerich, "The best voting system for any country will not be one
which meets any of the criteria completely, but will be one which provides the most
satisfactory overall balance between them, taking account of that country's history and
current circumstances" (Krennerich, 1996: 17). It is thus clear that the evaluation of
the respective functional demands cannot be seen in isolation from the particular
history of a country and the social and political context in which the electoral system
has to function (Butler, Penniman and Ranney, 1981: 8).
In deeply divided societies - as opposed to relative homogenous societies - the
representation function is of prime necessity and exceeds in importance all of the
other functions. The system's simplicity would be more important in countries with
high illiteracy rates than in societies with a fairly low rate of illiteracy.
According to Krennerich (1996) this evaluation of a system's functional demands is
not free from the views and interests of the political players involved. In order to
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obtain parliamentary representation, the representation function of the system will be
of primary concern to small parties. In the case of South Africa it would include
parties like the Freedom Front, the Christian Democratic Party and the Pan Africanist
Congress (PAC). In contrast, it would be in the interest of the strongest party, the
ANC, to favour the concentration function so as to gain an absolute majority in
Parliament.
Therefore, an important issue for lawmakers and politicians, especially in newly
democratised countries, is the type of electoral system to be employed in electing the
new government. Section 46.(1)(d) of South Africa's Constitution prescribes an
electoral system which results "in general, in proportional representation. It also
provides for a minimum voting age of 18 in Section 46.(l)(c), and an electorate based
on a national common voters' roll - which was not required for the 1994 elections -
(46.(1 )(b))" (Electoral Institute of South Africa, 1999).
There is an infinite number of electoral systems, but there are two basic principles of
representation from which all electoral systems originate. These are (1) the principle
of majority representation, and (2) the principle of proportional representation (De
Ville and Steytier, 1996:7; Harrop and Miller, 1987; Butler, Penniman and Ranney,
1981; Bogdanor and Butler, 1983). According to De Ville and Steytier, the distinction
between these two basic principles of representation is based mainly on their political
objectives regarding the outcome of the elections. Whereas the major aim of the
principle of majority representation (MR) is to produce a parliamentary majority for
one party or a coalition of parties, the major aim of the principle of proportional
representation (PR) is to accurately reflect the social forces and political groups in
parliament, (De Ville and Steytier, 1996:8).
For the purpose of this study the focus will be placed on the PR-systems of
representation, because South Africa employs the closed-list variant of this particular
system. Emphasis on this particular electoral system also stems from the notion that
in relation to the other types of electoral systems in use, the proportional system is
said to be the least expensive to employ.
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1.10 PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS OF REPRESENTATION
According to Harrop and Miller (1987:47; see also Lijphart and Grofman, 1984;
Faure, 1996), proportional representation has been used in the past to provide
proportional representation for ethnic and religious groups, and for political parties.
Harrop and Miller (1987:47) posit that just prior to the First World War, proportional
representation was introduced in Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, Moravia, and
Finland to give adequate representation to religious and ethnic minorities as a means
of integrating them into the wider political system. After the war, PR was introduced
to curb the strength of the socialist parties which threatened the livelihood of the old
middle-class parties.
For Basson (1984:3) and Faure (1996:193-208) the principle of proportional
representation - which have its roots in 19th century liberalism as portrayed in the
works of John Stuart Mill - implies that the size of all the groups represented in
parliament should be in direct proportion to the number of votes they obtained during
the elections. Equally important for our understanding of this particular notion,
Bogdanor (1984:46) as well as Lijphart and Grofman (1984:5), posit that proportional
representation does not refer to a specific electoral system, but rather to an ideal or
principle to which different electoral systems seek to conform, namely the accurate
parliamentary representation of all the different groups in society. There are obviously
a considerable number of proportional systems. Each of these different systems
functions in its specific manner to achieve the common goal of proportionality, and
these systems may have different political consequences. The six main types of
electoral systems which apply the principle of proportional representation are:
• The Single-Transferable Vote System (STV -system);
• The PR List Systems at the National Level (Pure Proportional System);
• The PR List Systems in Variable Multi-Member Districts;
• The PR List Systems in Multi-Member Districts with Additional Seats at Regional
and/or National Level;
• The Mixed-Member Proportional System (Personalised Proportional
Representation); and
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• The Compensatory System (Mixed-Member Proportional System).
1.11 SUMMARY
For the purpose of this essay the PR List System at the National Level will be the
focus of discussion. The closed list variant is the system used in the South African
case. As mentioned above, this is relevant to the administrative factors that influence
the cost of the election process.
At the most fundamental level elections establish the norms by which political power
could be wielded in a society. It helps to determine how a country is governed, who
the people are who would exercise that power, and what a government in power
actually does (LeDuc in LeDuc et al. 1996:344). Elections are thus important in that:
1. They are one means of transmitting demands to the authorities, and filtering them
through the procedures of constructing manifestos, planning campaigns, etc ..
2. They are indicators of support for the incumbents.
3. To a significant extent elections determine the priorities in policy outputs of the
governing authorities, since their re-election depends on the adherence (if only
partially) to the will and demands of the electorate, and
4. It is one of the ways in which the public and the politicians communicate with
each other. The elections provide feedback in such a way as to improve the
responsiveness of government (LeDuc et al., 1996; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984;
Reeve and Ware, 1992; Heywood, 1997; Harrop and Miller, 1987).
The contention of this chapter is that elections are important components of any
democratic system, and that the choice of electoral system could significantly affect
both the political stability of a country and also the cost of the election process. It is
true, however, that democracy entails certainly much more than periodically electing
public officials, but it cannot be less than that. The question that subsequently arises
is what financial outlay any state, and especially developing democracies, could afford
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to devote to this crucial component of democracy when such a state is faced with
much more pressing socio-economic issues.
A further contention of this chapter is that extravagant electoral expenditure is no
guarantor of free and fair elections. The pivotal factors are sound electoral planning
and simplicity, in other words working within the confines and limitations of the
electorate.
In the next sections the paper will concentrate on the following:
Chapter 2: A discussion on the South African Electoral Machinery: its Features and
Cost Implications;
Chapter 3: A Comparative Look at the 1999 South African Election: Overt as well as
Hidden Costs, and Comparing it to the Cases ofIndia, Australia, Israel and Mexico;
Chapter 4: Political Party Funding and the Implications of the overall Cost of the
Elections;
Chapter 5: Conclusion, Summary and Recommendations with regard to the Areas in
the Electoral Process where financial Expenditures could be reduced.
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CHAPTER2
The South African Electoral Machinery: Its Features and Cost
Implications
2.1 INTRODUCTION
South Africa has a national party list system. It is easy to comprehend the basic
principle underlying this system, according to Farrell (1997 :60). Each party
contending in the elections, draws up a list of candidates in each constituency - which
may vary in size, eg. provinces of country as a whole - and the size of these lists is
based on the number of seats to be filled. In its most elementary form, voters vote for
political parties instead of individual candidates. The proportion of votes that each
party receives determines the number of seats it may take up in parliament. It is
important also to bear in mind that the degree of proportionality is maximised in the
event that the entire country is used as one vast constituency, as in the cases of for
instance Israel and South Africa.
There are two variants in the list system: (a) the 'closed' list or non-preferential
system; and (b) the 'open' list system. For the most part the 'closed' list system is used
in "newer" democracies such as Argentina, Israel, Portugal, Spain and South Africa
(Farrell, 1997:73; see also Bogdanor, 1984; De Ville and Steytler, 1996; and Lijphart,
1994). This is so because of the advantages the 'closed' list system poses to party
leaders.
It is not difficult to see what the advantages are for the party elite of such a system,
since they can draw up their lists in such a manner so as to maximise the possibility
that their preferred candidates be elected. There are also clear advantages to this
system wherever a party wishes to increase its proportion of, for instance, female MPs
or to guarantee a minimum proportion of seats to ethnic minorities, who may not have
received some presentation under any other system. The first democratic elections of
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post-apartheid South Africa in April 1994 illustrated this point eloquently. According
to Reynold (in Farrell, 1997:73), the South African electorate had absolutely no
influence over what person(s) would represent them within their voting districts or at
national and provincial level; nor did they have any say over the rank-order of the
candidates on these lists.
The first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system of the previous apartheid regime was
replaced by the ('closed') list PR, with half of the National Assembly (200 members)
being chosen from nine provincial lists and the other half being elected from a single
national list. No threshold for representation was imposed and the country used one
nation-wide constituency for the conversion of votes into seats in order to secure, as
mentioned earlier, maximum proportionality. For a discussion on this feature see De
Ville and Steytler, 1996; and Reynolds and Reilly, 1997. The 'Droop' quota was used
to apportion seats, and surplus seats were awarded by an adaptation of the largest-
remainder method (Reynolds and Reilly, 1997:67; Southall, 1994). Ballot papers
contained party names and logos, and colour photographs of the party leaders.
According to Reynold (in Farrell, 1997:73) these "national, and unalterable, candidate
lists allowed parties to present ethnically heterogeneous groups of candidates, which it
was hoped, would have cross-cutting appeal."
However, before venturing into the particulars of the 1994 and subsequent general
elections, clarity must be sought as to what institutional body bears the responsibility
of conducting and overseeing the whole electoral process in South Africa.
2.2 THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Most elections, according to Choe and Damolf (1999:2), are conducted by two
separate but co-ordinating organs, called "election management bodies": (1) an
organisational body in charge of the administration of the electoral process; and (2) a
juridical body in charge of judging and deciding electoral disputes and complaints.
Important too in this regard is that the independence of these two bodies - especially
in countries that have recently made the transition to democratic governance - is of
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paramount importance in lending legitimacy and credibility to the electoral process.
However, since the budget of the election administration body (especially the
organisational body) is dependent on the State coffers, it raises questions pertaining to
the perceived or real "independence" of such an institution. Since top government
officials, and specifically the President, appoint the members of the juridical body,
similar concerns regarding the independence of this latter function in electoral matters
may be raised (Choe and Damelf 1999:4).
Illustrating the importance of the perceived independence of the election
administrative body by both the electorate and opposition, Pastor (1999) cites one of
the reasons why so many democratic transitions become derailed, is the real or
perceived bias of the election commission in favour of the incumbent. According to
Pastor (1999:2), "Repeated failures to conduct elections· that are judged free and fair
by all sides can lead to political instability."
According to the South African Electoral Commission Act (1996), the Electoral
Commission (EC) is an independent body subject only to the Constitution and the law.
From the onset though it should be emphasised that there are considerable differences
with regard to the Commission that conducted the 1994 elections and the one that
conducted the 1999 elections. (See Glenda Fick, 1999: "The Independent Electoral
Commission: The Old and the New" for a detailed account of these differences.)
2.2.1 THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1994
The elections in 1994 were conducted by a central Independent Electoral Commission
established under the Interim Constitution and the Independent Electoral Commission
Act, both designed to lead South Africa from its oppressive past to a new democratic
society (Hamby, 1999). The lEC was established by statute during a time in the
history of South Africa in which Parliament was sovereign. This body was
established by section 4 of the Independent Electoral Commission Act 150 of 1993. It
was created as an ad hoc institution to ensure that the 1994 elections took place (Fick,
1998:2).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21
In 1994, the lEC consisted of sixteen members, five of whom were from the
international community. The Commission, who was accountable to the Transitional
Executive Council, was composed of an Election Administration Directorate, an
Election Monitoring Directorate and an Election Adjudication Secretariat. The
Commission established for the 1999 elections, however, consisted of fewer members
(only five) and were appointed by the President. This led to serious questions being
raised by observers with regard to the impartiality of the new Commission (Hamby,
1999).
Opposition parties too questioned the "independence" of the Commission in the run-
up to the 1999 national elections (Hamby, 1999). The findings of a Markdata poll
conducted among 2 200 respondents in September 1998 posited the overall level of
complete trust amongst political party supporters in the EC to be very low. Only
51.8% of the respondents felt that they could trust the EC to manage the election
process in a fair and just manner (Jones, Lodge and Ntuli, 1998: 4-6). This
consideration is of paramount importance when attention is paid in chapter 5 to the
recommendations aimed at reducing the financial costs of the election process.
2.2.1.1 CHALLENGES FACING THE IEC IN 1994
Since its inception in 1993 the lEC was faced with difficulties in the execution of its
task to supervise and administer the 1994 general elections. Having met for the first
time as a committee on 20 December 1993, the lEC had four months at its disposal to
prepare for the elections that were set to be held on 27 April 1994. An additional
strain was placed on the Committee because an administrative infrastructure still
needed to be put in place.
The time constraint forced the lEC to bypass normal tender procedures. This also
meant that readily available, but more expensive options, had to be taken in the fields
of telecommunications and information technology (IEC, 1995 :9-10). As the elections
drew closer the political environment became increasingly unstable and the risk
involved in conducting the elections in such an unstable political climate was
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escalating. The opposition from certain political parties, especially the Inkhata
Freedom Party (IFP) and the Conservative Party (CP), which rejected the Interim
Constitution and were not in favour of the elections being conducted in terms of this
Constitution, also needed to be assuaged.
According to Sulcas (The Sunday Independent, 6 June 1999:4), the IEC was armed
with considerable statutory powers and was given a financial carte blanche. Some R4
billion was spent on the elections, according to the then Finance Minister Derek
Keyes. This amount is in stark contrast with the one released in the official financial
report (see table 1) of the lEe. The IEC, however, still faced most probably its most
daunting obstacle to the performance of its task: it was a body without precedent in
South African experience, an unknown entity with no proven track record. Despite all
the initial perceived or real obstacles, both national and international observers
regarded the elections to have been conducted in a free and fair manner. It signalled
not only "a triumph for the democratic ideal, but the resounding defeat of racism as an
organising principle of government" (Southall, 1994:629). Thus, given all the initial
constraints faced by the IEC, they pulled off one of post-independent Africa's political
miracles.
According to Kotzé (2000), of the estimated 22 million eligible voters in the country,
more than 19.5 million people cast their votes, representing a voter turnout of 86.9%.
There were 11 677 voting stations in 78 countries, the vast majority of which were in
South Africa, with a number of stations established in South African Embassies and
Consulates in various states. Of these voting stations 950 were mobile, 1 047 were
special, and 187 were in foreign states. Only 0.99% (193081) of the total ballots were
spoilt, and, according to official reports released by the IEC, votes were cast at an
average cost ofR46.00 (*US $12.98) each (IEC, 1994).
(*Calculated at the exchange rate on 1May, 1994)
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2.2.1.2 THE "LIBERATION ELECTIONS" OF 1994
The 1994 national elections revolved around political liberation and political
transition, where the politics of exclusion were replaced by those of inclusiveness
(Lodge, 1995:471). It was a move from the "old" to the "new". Southall (1994:88) is
correct in asserting that the April 1994 national elections "represented the culmination
of a complex transitional process which may be dated as having begun on 2 February
1990, when President F.W. de Klerk proclaimed the unbanning of the ANC and other
organisations." He (De Klerk) also announced the release of political prisoners and
committed his government to the negotiation of a fully inclusive, non-racial and
democratic constitution. South Africa's first universal elections, labelled the
"liberation elections", were also the stage for two interesting processes: (a) the
transformation of Nelson Mandela from political prisoner to President, and (b) the
transfer of political power in a spirit of national reconciliation (Karis, 1994).
The results of the 1994 elections came as no real surprise to observers, except to the
National Party, who anticipated to fare much better than it actually did. Its hopes of
doing well in the elections were based on:
(a) The collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe in 1989, whence the ANC
received most of its financial, logistical and military support.
(b) The withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and a receding Soviet interest in the
region which reduced the threat of a "total onslaught", and
(c) It was levelled in the hope that the euphoria and mythical status surrounding
Nelson Mandela would have had worn off by the time of the elections, thus
"eliminating" him as a source of electoral support for the ANC (Meredith,
1994:17-18).
By capturing a 62.6% share of the vote, the ANC secured 252 parliamentary seats, just
shy of a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The National Party gained 80 seats,
followed by the Inkatha Freedom Party with 43 seats. The four other parties that
gained just enough support to secure national representation were the Freedom Front,
the Democratic Party, the Pan-Africanist Congress and the African Christian
Democratic Party (Lodge, 1995:471). These seven political parties then discussed and
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decided on the current legislative principles guiding the State funding of the election
activities of political parties. In the event these principles attracted fierce resistance
from opposition parties that subsequently contested the 1999 elections.
TABLE 1: Independent Electoral Commission - 1994 Income and Expenditure
Statement for the Period ended 30 September 1994
R
Income 979078426
Grants received 970382030
Interest received 7262919
Other income 1 433477
Expenditure 912131326
Personnel expenditure 461 350013
Salaries 460960558
Allowances 389455
Advertisements 30 191 925
Assets written off 86355224
Computer expenses 1 395 157
Court fees 14953
Entertainment 156 113
Freight charges 38251701
Foreign voters 2955414
Insurance 33441 603
Other expenditure 8 196 147
Postal and telephone 15536702
Printing 57230683
Private and public transport 78408015
Professional, consultancy, audit, legal 25974 109
fees, bank charges and security
Publications 1 250560
Rental of equipment 6054790
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Rental of premises 18 119869
Repairs and maintenance 5 172 732
Stationery 8681 472
Staff accommodation and conference 10228138
facilities
Subsistence, catering and refreshments 15684687
Uniforms 4263 091
Voter education gaps 3218228
Accumulated Surplus 66947100
(Source: Independent Electoral Commission, October 1994)
In conclusion it has to be said that despite all the reservations expressed regarding the
operations of the IEC, its achievements in the 1994 elections were nothing short of a
miracle. With only a few months at its disposal in preparing for a historic event the
lEC passed the test with flying colours. And in this regard credit has to be given to
the men and women who made it possible that millions of South Africans could cast
their vote on 27 April 1994.
2.2.2 LEGISLATION REGARDING THE "NEW" lEe
In 1996 the South African Electoral Commission (a permanent institution) replaced
the Independent Electoral Commission - the body in charge of South Africa's first
democratic elections in 1994. Although established to perform similar tasks, "the
constitutional and political context applicable to each was quite distinct" (Fick,
1998:9). The Constitution and the Electoral Commission Act stipulates that the
Electoral Commission is responsible for ensuring free and fair elections (The
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, Section 190). It has to promote
conditions that are conducive to and will secure free and fair elections (Electoral
Commission Act, 1996, Section Sb). This implies that if the 1994 elections were to
have been judged on these principles, it would not have fulfilled the requirements to
be classified as free and fair. According to Mchunu of the EC, this implies that the
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Commission should act as and in effect is the guardian of representative democracy in
South Africa (Mdhlela, 1998: 15).
Being responsible for the implementation of the legislative requirements in a
transparent manner, the Commission has to monitor and assess the result of such
implementation. The Electoral Commission Act (1996, Section Sb) requires that the
Electoral Commission facilitate actions and should intervene when implementation
fails, or when new issues should arise. Procedures and codes thus need to be created,
and co-operation between election stakeholders needs to be established to deal with
problems that may arise.
The Commission is funded by Parliament and its financial records are subject to audit
by the Auditor General (Electoral Commission Act 1996, Sections 12(2)(b) & 13(1)
and 13(3)). Further Sections of the Act (14(1-4)), stipulate that the Commission shall
report to the National Assembly annually on its finances. In addition, it must relay
any information required by the President about the Commission's activities, shall
publish a post-election report, and it may publish a report on the likelihood or
otherwise that it would be able to ensure that a pending election will be free and fair.
2.2.3 THE 1999 ELECTORAL COMMISSION
The "new" Electoral Commission was established in terms of Chapter nine of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa and the Electoral Commission Act 51 of
1996. In early January 1999 the activities of the EC were disrupted by the sudden
resignation of its chairman, Judge Johann Kriegler. This meant that a new chairperson
had to be appointed by President Mandela. A multi-party committee of Parliament
and a majority of the National Assembly approved the appointment of Brigalia Bam as
the new chairperson (Forrest et aI., 1999).
In accordance with legislation the Commission consists of five people. One of these
five members, according to the law, has to be a Judge (Electoral Commission Act
1996, Sections 2(1) and 3(1)). Consequently the resignation of Judge Kriegler saw
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Judge Ismail Hussain being appointed in his place as the new Commissioner (Naidu,
1999).
The appointment of Bam met with some fierce criticism from opposition parties. Her
appointment by President Mandela, shortly after the resignation of Judge Kriegler,
outraged the Democratic Party and the New National Party who alleged that the
President did not honour an agreement to consult them on the appointment of the new
EC chairperson (Cape Argus, 22 February 1999; The Star, 2 February 1999; Die
Burger, 20 February 1999; The Star, 27 January 1999). According to Naidu (The
Star, 22 February 1999) several other rival parties, however, welcomed Bam's
appointment. According to O'Grady (Business Day, 7 May 1999:1), Bam's
appointment as chairperson was as a result of a perception amongst senior members in
Parliament that she was committed to transformation and had an "appropriate"
understanding of the role of the EC - which Judge Kriegler apparently lacked.
Most likely Judge Kriegler's decision to resign followed as a result of a perception
amongst senior politicians that his view of the role and function of the EC was
irreconcilable with that of the government and with views held by some members of
the Commission (Greybe, 1999; Mail and Guardian, 29 January 1999). The judge
was also at loggerheads with government regarding its ruling that all voters had to
have bar-coded identity documents during the 1999 elections. He. felt that this
measure would disenfranchise many potential voters and also inflate the cost of the
elections. Needless to say, government did not share these sentiments. A dispute with
the Department of State Expenditure regarding the "underfunding" of the Commission
which, according to Judge Kriegler, undermined the independence of the EC,
apparently further prompted the Judge's decision to resign (Beeld, 30 January 1999:3).
The EC's problems could traced back to the government's tardiness in appointing the
members of the Commission. It was only in 1997 that the government appointed the
Commissioners and most of the senior staff (Business Day, 27 January 1999; Business
Day, 6 April 1998: 1-2). Once appointed, the operations of the EC were further
delayed when the Commission and government reached al) impasse on the salaries and
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staffing structure of the EC. This resulted in the EC having to delay the recruitment of
its staff (Business Day, 26 March 1998:4; Business Day, 6 April 1998: 1-2).
Apparent from the late appointment of the EC was the perception that no lessons were
learnt from the 1994 election experience. The same process of hasty planning that
accompanied preparations for the first elections, repeated itself during the 1999
elections. However, in all fairness to those responsible for conducting the 1994
elections, it needs to be reiterated that the haste accompanying the preparations for the
elections was understandable within the socio-political context in which the particular
elections transpired. The elections in 1994 dawned upon the people of South Africa
with a speed very few have anticipated and as a consequence preparations had to be
done at the very last minute.
2.3 CONCLUSION
The different socio-political context in which South Africa's second elections took
place necessitated the creation of a new Electoral Commission. Concomitant to the
appointment, albeit very late, of this "new" Commission was the implicit expectation
of an improved organisational performance. However, friction between the Chairman
(Judge Kriegler) of the Commission and other state departments over the budget and
consequent independence of the Commission limited the time available to the
Commission to adequately execute its undertakings. The time constraint meant that
the Commission had to resort to expensive technology - as happened in the 1994
elections - in order to ensure that the elections in fact took place as scheduled.
There is also some contradictory evidence pertaining to the financial expenditure
during the 1994 elections. According to the lEC, it spent somewhat more than R900
million - an amount which is more than R3 billion less than the amount the then
Minister of Finance Derek Keys disclosed to reporters at the time.
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CHAPTER3
A Comparative Look at The 1999 South African Election
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The 1999 elections in South Africa signalled to a significant extent the start of the
country's move towards democratic consolidation. It was not surprising then that both
popular and academic debates during the 1999 election campaign were dominated by
the prospect of an ANC two-thirds majority at the polls and the implications for the
South African democracy.
It was also the first time that a national common voters' roll was introduced in the
country. The EC completed the task of compiling the list on 30 April, when its Chief
Executive Officer (CEO), Mandla Mchunu, presented the certified voters' roll to the
Deputy President (EISA, 1999: 1). The roll, one of the longest official documents in
South African history, contained 960 000 pages. However, not even this venture
proceeded without some controversy which was caused by speculations that millions
of potential voters were omitted from the final roll. In the end, more than 18 million
people registered to vote - see Table 2 - (18 363 300), and the roll contained the
names of a million more woman than men.
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TABLE 2: The Final Voters' Roll For the 1999 Elections
Province Registered Percentage of Potential
Voters
Eastern Cape 2484298 76.84
Free State 1 239464 81.74
Gauteng 4215775 89.94
FCvv~ulu-~atal 3473 629 74.12
Mpumalanga 1 290545 83.54
Northern Cape 380227 79.14
Northern Province 1 872 572 77.68
North West 1 538223 81.17
Western Cape 1 868567 80.64
Total 18363300 80.64
(Source: lEC, 30 April 1999)
In the excitement and sometimes mayhem that characterised the compilation of the
voters' roll, little attention was paid to the price tag of this democratic exercise. In
some instances the cost of this process could be attributed to the introduction of new
measures to ensure that the voting process was conducted in a free and fair manner.
However, because of time constraints, the 1999 elections as a consequence differed in
many respects from the one held in 1994. It saw amongst others the introduction of
state of the art computer technology, the primary aim of which was to make the
electoral process more cost and time efficient.
3.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 1994 AND 1999 ELECTIONS
There were several differences beween the 1994 and the 1999 elections. Whereas the
1994 elections were generally seen to have been a "liberation" election, the elections
of 1999 were regarded as part of the consolidation process of the country's
democracy. Consequently, the 1999 national elections were marked by a number of
departures from the elections held in 1994 (see table 3 for a list of these differences).
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Some of these departures, for example the requirement of bar-coded identity
documents, met with fierce resistance from opposition parties who claimed that this
was a move by the incumbent regime aimed at reducing and marginalising the support
of the opposition.
TABLE 3: Differences between the 1994 and 1999 Elections
1994 Election 1999 Election
Demarcation of Boundaries? Yes Yes
Delimitation of Wards? No Yes
Voter Registration? No Yes
National Voters Roll? No Yes
Geographical Information Systems? No Yes
Overseas Voting Stations? Yes No
(Source: Adaptedfrom EISA, 1999)
3.3 THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY
Democracy is invariably accompanied by a financial tag, one part of which is the cost
of periodic elections. These elections are commonly accompanied by extensive voter
registration and voter education campaigns, and also at times - such as in the case of
South Africa - the need to experiment with new technology (Smith, 1998). This is all
done to secure free and fair elections, and lending international credibility to a
nation's democratic credentials. There is moreover a need to have credible, free and
fair elections that are not too expensive. As a consequence, it becomes important to
pinpoint the factors that have a direct or indirect influence on the cost of elections.
These cost-influencing factors, according to Reynold and Reilly (1997) and Lopez-
Pintor (1999), could be categorised as:
(1) Administrative; and
(2) Capacity-building factors, especially within countries with a very limited or no
previous experience with democratic elections.
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(1) Administrative Factors Influencing Electoral Expenditure
The cost factor in the electoral process, more specifically the choice of the electoral
system, remains and will continue to be a major area of consideration for any country.
This is could be ascribed to the choice that an electoral system has, according to
Reynold and Reilly (1997): (a) a wide range of administrative consequences which
impose certain constraints, and (b) by simply choosing the least expensive system may
prove to be disastrous for the entire political system and for democratic stability in
particular.
Six factors were identified that may have probable cost implications: the drawing of
boundaries, the registration of voters, the design of the ballots, voter education, the
number of elections, and the counting of the votes (Reynold and Reilly, 1997: 115-
119):
• The drawing of electoral boundaries:
List PR systems are often the cheapest and easiest to administer, because either one
single national constituency - such as Israel - or very large multi-member districts
that dovetail with pre-existing boundaries, are used. First-Past- The-Post (FPTP),
Alternative Vote (AV), and Two Round (TR) systems prove to be more expensive,
since constituencies' boundaries have to be adjusted regularly to take population
changes into account. Although the Block Vote, the Single Non- Transferable Vote
(SNTV), Parallel, Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) and Single Transferable Vote
(STV) systems also require the demarcation of the electorate, they are easier to
manage than the three systems mentioned before, because they use multi-member
districts, which tend to be fewer and larger (see Lijphart, 1994; Bogdanor, 1994;
Harrop and Miller, 1987; for a discussion on the difference between these systems).
• The registration of voters:
This aspect is often the least successful, most intricate and contentious part of
electoral administration. Political systems using single-member voting districts quite
often require that all voters should be registered within the boundaries of the district.
In terms of voter registration, the most expensive and administratively time-
consuming systems are: Parallel, MMP, FPTP, AV and TRS systems. The Block
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Vote, SNTV and STV systems with their fewer multi-member districts, facilitate the
process much more for administrators, whilst large district List PR-systems are the
least complicated. lts simplicity was a contributing factor in the adoption of regional
List PR at South Africa's first democratic elections in 1994. Despite this variance in
complexity between the different electoral systems,. the cost of voter registration
remains a highly expensive endeavour irrespective of the electoral system employed.
• The Design of Ballot Papers:
The extent to which ballot papers are user-friendly contributes largely to the reduction
in "spoilt" or invalid votes and in maximising electoral participation. This entails the
use of symbols for parties and candidates, photographs and colours, as happen in
South Africa. FPTP and AV ballot papers are often easiest to print, and in most cases
contain a small number of names. Although just as easy to print, its production cost is
often doubled since TRS ballots, in most cases, have to be reprinted for a second
round of voting. Despite the fact that they are both for a single election, Parallel and
MMP systems usually require the printing of at least two ballots. Slightly more
complex than the FPTP ballots, SNTV, Block Vote, and STV ballots contain more
candidates, symbols and photographs. List PR ballot papers, on the other hand, can
prove to be either very simple, as in a closed list system (as is the South African case,
as illustrated by the low percentage of spoilt ballots) or very complex (as in the case of
Switzerland with its free list system).
• Voter Education:
Each society's needs for voter education is quite distinct from other states'. Clearly
identifiable differences also exist between each electoral system pertaining to the
education of voters on how to complete their ballots. The principles underlying the
voting processes in preferential systems, such as AV or STV, are quite complex if
they are being used for the first time. Voter education needs to address this issue,
particularly if there are compulsory numbering requirements as in the case of Australia
(see Farnsworth, 1997). The same notion regarding voting complexity holds true for
MMP systems. After 50 years of using MMP, many Germans are still under the
misapprehension that both their votes are equal. In reality the second "national PR"
vote is the overriding determinant of party strength in parliament. In contrast with the
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preferential and MMP systems, the principles underlying categorical, single-vote
systems, such as FPTP or SNTV, are comparatively easy to comprehend.
• The Number and Timing of Elections:
The least costly and least complicated to administer are the FPTP, AV, Block, SNTV,
List PR and STV electoral systems, generally requiring just one election on one day.
Parallel and MMP systems have logistical implications for the training of election
officials and the way in which people vote, since they are essentially a mixture of two
or more very different electoral systems. These two-round systems are costly and
difficult to administer, because they often require the whole electoral process to be re-
run a week or a fortnight after the first round of elections.
• Counting the Vote:
As only a single total figure of votes for each party or candidate is required to compute
the results, FPTP, SNTV and simple closed-list PR systems are the easiest to count.
The Block Vote requires the polling officials to count a number of votes on a single
ballot paper. Parallel and MMP systems virtually invariably require the counting of
two ballot papers. AV and STV, as preferential systems requiring numbers to be
marked on the ballot, are more complex to count, particularly in the case of STV,
which requires continual re-calculations of surplus transfer values and the like .
.According to Reynold and Reilly (1997), List PR systems, and in particular national
closed-list systems, are on an abstract level the cheapest to run and require fewer
administrative resources as opposed to other systems. In their assertion they allow for
the more pragmatic situational factors which may render their view to be incorrect.
They are thus not asserting their point to be an absolute, but allow for deviant cases
that may contradict their expectation.
(2) Capacity-Building Factors Influencing the Cost of Elections
According to Lopez-Pintor (1999:57-58), high electoral costs could be attributed to at
least two factors: Ca)The experience with multi-party elections in a country, where
the cost of elections is higher in countries with a limited experience with multi-party
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elections; and (b) In countries where the elections are part of peace-keeping
operations. A third factor, not mentioned by Lopez-Pintor that may influence the cost
of elections, is the introduction of new technological advances - an element usually
introduced to decrease electoral expenditure, but it actually has the potential to inflate
expenses incurred.
In assessing the cost of the 1999 elections it becomes apparent that a country's history,
political context, experience with elections and available resources are the primary
determinants of the types of constraints that any electoral system places on a country's
administrative capacity and the costs involved in conducting the elections.
3.4 THE COST OF THE 1999 ELECTION
According to Baxter (in Sulcas, 1999:20), the June 1999 election amounted to an
expensive exercise. It is generally the contention of this researcher that when taking
into account some of the differences between the 1999 and the 1994 elections, and
especially the introduction of new technology in the whole electoral process, the
average cost per voter should have shown a dramatic decline. Also, since the
country's first experience with democratic elections in 1994 left very little scope to
prepare in terms of capacity building (as posited earlier in the paper), the logical
assumption would be that the election expenditure should be on par with that of other
developing democracies in the world. However, this did not materialise and
according to Baxter (in Sulcas, 1999:20) South Africa's June 1999 national elections
were the 4th or 5th most expensive in the world.
In assessmg the cost associated in conducting an election, two types of cost
considerations should be taken into account: (a) the direct costs, and (b) the indirect
costs. Direct costs refer to expenditures on such items as the hiring of land and
buildings, equipment, administration, and personnel (see table 3). Indirect costs refer
to expenditures incurred by the Department of Safety and Security in the deployment
of the armed forces, money spent by the Department of Home Affairs on issuing bar-
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coded identity documents to the electorate, the loss to the national economy, and the
money spent on the inauguration ceremony of the President.
3.4.1 DIRECT COSTS
Unlike in 1994, when the Independent Electoral Commission was given a financial
carte blanche, the Electoral Commission in 1999 had to operate within a fixed budget.
Unhappiness with the approved budget, and financial and administrative control over
the EC were major sources of friction between the Commission and the Departments
of State Expenditure and Home Affairs (EISA Election Update 99, 1999: 3; Business
Day, 6 April 1998:1-2; Mail and Guardian, 29 January - 4 February 1999:2-3). The
Commission's initial requested amount of R1.2 billion for the 1998/99 financial year
was downscaled by the government so that the EC's budget amounted to a total of
R965 million for the elections, but it initially received only R500 million plus an
amount ofR40 million from a roll-over from its 1994 budget.
Threats by the head of the Commission, Judge Johann Kriegler, that he would resign if
the EC continued to be underfunded, materialised after the government refused to
grant extra funds for the operations of the EC (Business Day, 13 July 1998). In
November 1998 the government announced that an extra R100 million would be
granted to the EC during the current financial year (1998/99, ending in March), but a
further request for an additional R230 million - which was needed to prepare the new
voters' roll - was rejected (Mail and Guardian, 6 November 1998). This, in
combination with other factors, eventually led to Judge Kriegler's resignation as EC
Chairman on 26 January 1999 (The Citizen, 27 January 1999). He was replaced by
the EC's Vice Chair, Brigalia Bam, who was appointed by President Nelson Mandela
as Chairperson, with Judge Ismail Hussain taking Bam's place as EC Commissioner
(The Star, 22 February 1999: 3).
On 20 February 1999 Brigalia Bam announced that the funding crisis that faced the
elections had been resolved after an announcement by Government that it would grant
R713.5 million to the Commission for its 1999/2000 financial year (Sunday Times, 21
February 1999). (See table 4 on a summary of the budget of the EC) The claim by
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Bam that the "fmancial commitment is sufficient to cover the cost of the elections and
also provides for contingencies that may be faced by the EC during the election year",
was in stark contrast to that made by the previous Chairman of the Commission, Judge
Kriegler. Shortly before his resignation he stated that, "it's impossible to conduct
national elections ... in South Africa ... with the current financial means of the lEC ... "
(EISA Election Update 99, NO.5: 1999:17).
There are still conflicting accounts as to the exact amount of money that was spent on
the 1999 national elections. The 'official' amount granted to the EC (R713.S million)
did not include for instance the R202 000 the EC spent on contingency planning,
relating to marking ink, the rental of voting stations and furniture, the funding of local
electoral officers, and special votes pending the outcome of litigation. According to
Sulcas (in the Sunday Independent,6 June 1999:4), the EC was awarded the following
amounts by government for the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 financial years respectively:
R640 million and R713.S million.
The elections were also characterised by the deployment of state of the art technology
reminiscent of that used by NASA for missile launches (Mail and Guardian, 4-10
June 1999:22; Pretoria News, 20 May 1999:3; Beeld, 20 May 1999:12). The main
auditorium of the Pretoria showground was transformed into a hi-tech election nerve
centre. It was furnished with 600 computers, 300 desktop computers and a leading-
edge satellite system that relayed and processed the computer data.
In setting up this 12 000m2 results centre, an extra cellular tower and a microwave
tower for high power telecommunications, as well as 2 000 telephone lines, 120 fax
lines and 30 km of computer cable, were used. It is especially here that the pivotal
role played by the administration and support services was illustrated. A vital section
of these services was the Information Technology function, implementing and
maintaining the daily operations of the EC, and also facilitating the online
communications between the different authorities and the nerve centre (The Star,
1999: 11 June).
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All this was in place to speed up the process of declaring the election results. The Ee
is given seven days by the Electoral Act to declare the election results, but with the
help of this technology, the Ee expected to have the results out by 3 June (Granelli,
1999:3). The Information Technology infrastructure was composed of a nationwide
satellite Wide Area Network (WAN) that allowed data to be "beamed" securely from
each polling station via satellite to the Ee headquarters and downloaded directly into
comprehensive databases of voter information. However, not even the most
ground breaking technology could secure a smooth ride into the elections. The Wide
Area Network (WAN) which formed the heart of the Ee's computer activities
unexpectedly crashed during a number of trial runs in the run-up to the election,
causing great consternation amongst election officials (Eastern Province Herald, 1
June 1999; Beeld, 2 June 1999). This contributed to the delay in the announcement
of the election results, and were only declared five days after the votes were cast.
It is not surprising that this centre had a R100 million price tag. Each political party
had its own office in the "nerve centre", the media had five television studios from
which to conduct interviews, and there were also twelve radio broadcast studios
(Pretoria News, 20 May 1999; Beeld, 20 May 1999:12). The investment in this
resource centre was perceived as (a) a move to lend legitimacy to the process by
delivering free and fair results, and it was (b) a move aimed at making the process
transparent, by inviting all political parties and the media to be present in the centre.
To secure the premises from possible intruders, the police, traffic police, the army, and
patrol guards were employed to guard the premises and surrounding area (Pretoria
News, 20 May 1999).
Security measures were also extended to the production of the ballot papers. Five
South African companies were charged with the enormous task of printing the ballot
papers for the 2 June national and provincial elections, as no single company would
have been able to perform this task within the one-week time frame that was available.
The ballots were printed on specially developed security paper equipped with
watermarks and UV characteristics to ensure that the ballot papers could not be
duplicated. The papers were produced at a cost of RIO million, which were
considerably less than the R25 million that was spent on the production of the 80
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million ballot papers printed abroad for the previous elections (Pretoria News, 20 May
1999).
An electronic mapping system, the Global Information System (GIS), was used to
demarcate the country into 14 650 voting districts. The EC recruited some 220 000
people to staff the voting stations (Mail and Guardian, 4-10 June 1999; Die
Volksblad, 21 May 1999:4; Die Volksblad, 19 May 1999:7). Un1ike during the prior
period of voter registration when the EC relied on 72 000 volunteers from the public
service, these public recruits served to signal the independence of the EC (Business
Day, 7 May 1999:1). 25000 Barcode scanners or "zip-zips" (as they were commonly
called), obtained at a cost of R90 million from ICL South Africa, were used to
consolidate and verify all the voter registration information from the voting stations
(The Sunday Independent, 30 May 1999:11). As with all new technology, they also
provided their fair share of teething troubles. Not only did the names of some people
who had in fact registered not appear on the voters' roll, but some election officers
also had to struggle with scanners' flat batteries. This resulted that these scanners
could not be used at number of the voting stations and election officers had to resort to
checking manually the voters' roll to check whether or not a person was eligible to
cast a vote (Eastern Province Herald, 1999; Die Volksblad, 21 May 1999:4).
A considerable amount of money was spent on the wages of the personnel at the
voting stations. There were five categories of employees at the polling stations and
each of them was paid different rates. Of the total number of people recruited 200 000
were employed as general electoral personnel, and the rest were employed as senior
officials. Those officials in charge of a voting station underwent two days of
extensive training beforehand and were paid R120.00 for this training period. During
the four days that they were employed by the EC, they were paid R240.00 per day.
Their deputies received similar training and were paid R100.00, and since they were
only being employed for one day, they received R200.00 for the day's work. The
general personnel each received R80.00 for the day's training that they underwent and
were paid R160.00 for their efforts on voting day (Die Volsblad, 21 May1999:4; Die
Volksblad, 27 March 1999:4).
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The EC did however try to minimalise the cost of their operations, and most of the
costs incurred were seen as long term investments that would reduce future electoral
expenses. The Commission rented as much equipment as possible and used specially
designed cardboard tables, chairs and polling booths which were sold for pulping after
the elections (Granelli, 1999). The technological infrastructure employed, is a
permanent structure and could also be put to other uses (The Sunday Independent, 30
May 1999:11).
3.4.2 INDIRECT COSTS:
The hidden costs of the election process amounted to a staggering sum. Apart from
the Rl.3 billion (the combined amount for the 1998/99 and 1999/2000 financial years)
allocated to the EC, the indirect costs, such as the expenditures of the Departments of
Home Affairs and of Safety and Security; and the loss to the economy of a day's
output, have so far not been calculated. This sum includes: (a) the costs (R86 million)
incurred by the Department of Home Affairs for the issuing of bar-coded identity
documents, and (b) the costs incurred by the Department of Defence for the
deployment of troops during the whole process; the amount of which has never been
disclosed, (c) the R47 million (of which RIO million was sponsored by the private
sector) for the inauguration party of the President, (d) the Rl.28 billion loss to the
national economy, according to Azar Jarnmine of "Econometrix", as a result of this
extra holiday and (e) the RIO million spent on granting prisoners the right to vote.
The Department of Safety and Security deployed over 100 000 South African Police
Service (SAPS) and South African Defence Force (SANDF) personnel to man polling
stations and to patrol the surrounding areas. According to Commissioner Karel
Kramer, the Divisional Commissioner for support services, the conservative estimate
for policing and rendering assistance to the EC was in the order of RIl 0 million. As
for the loss to the national economy, economist Azar Jarnmine of "Econometrix"
estimates the tally to be in the region of Rl.28 billion (The Sunday Independent, 6
June 1999:4).
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The requisite bar-coded identity documents were right from the outset a major source
of controversy. Opposition parties, in particular the New National Party and the
Democratic Party, fiercely objected to this measure. Judge Kriegler, who at that time
was still the Chairman of the EC, added his voice in objecting to the government's
plan to make bar-coded identity documents a prerequisite for casting a vote on the day
of the elections. Kriegler's main concerns were the extra financial strain this would
put on the electoral budget and the many thousands of potential voters that would be
disenfranchised by this step (Greybe, 1999; Beeld,30 January 1999). The exercise
which saw the Department of Home Affairs embark on a R36.5 million campaign to
encourage voters to obtain bar-coded identity documents, in the end resulted in this
Department overspending its budget by R50 million (The Sunday Independent, 6 June
1999:4).
Table 4: Official Budget Summary of the EC for the 1999 Election
DESCRIPTION ALLOCATION
(R1000)
Personnel 80425
Administration 14892
Stores 10074
Equipment 15908
Land and Buildings 8572
Professional and Special Services 231 361
Miscellaneous Expenditure 35
Voting Operations 352232
TOTAL 713 500*
(US $114 730 800)
Number of Registered Voters 18363300
Average Cost per Vote R38.82
US $6.25 (According to the US $ /Rand
exchange rate in June 1999)
(Source: Adapted from EC, 1999)
(*Thisfigure excludes the R202 000 used for contingency planning)
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It is evident, in using the official figures presented by the EC, that there was a
considerable reduction in the average cost per vote, being almost US $6.00 per vote
less than in 1994. This scenario changes somewhat when the indirect cost is added to
these official figures, as illustrated by table 5. The expenses for the Presidential
inauguration are omitted from this table since these expenses do not fall under the
jurisdiction of the EC. It should also be borne in mind that the cost of the permanent
staff of the EC for 1998, which amounted to R51 million (Barrell, 1998), does not
form part of the above calculations in table 4.
Table 5: The Accumulated Amount of the total Cost of the 1999 Election
Areas of Expenditure US$
lEC Official Budget 114730 800
Contingency Funds 35376
Dept. of Home Affairs 13 828 800
Dept. of Defence 17688 000
1998/1999 Budget 102912 000
State Funding of Political Parties 8522400
Loss to the Economy 205824 000
TOTAL AMOUNT 463541376*
Average cost per Vote US $25.24
(RI56.74)
(*Calculated at the RlUS$ exchange rate on 1June 1999)
In trying to assess the value for money of the expenses incurred during the South
African electoral process, the direct cost expenses incurred in amongst others India,
Israel, Mexico and Australia will be the focus of the next section.
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3.5 COMPARING THE CASES OF INDIA, ISRAEL, MEXICO AND
AUSTRALIA
3.5.1 INTRODUCTION
According to Roberts (1986:7), the most obvious contention that confronts any
researcher, when engaging in comparative studies, is: how can states be best
compared? It is an issue of paramount importance since there are so many different
features that could be listed about any state. Features relating to its area, geographical
location, the size of its population, its economic organisation and social structure, its
form of government, matters concerning its electoral procedures and party systems,
and also issues relating to its Constitution, are all part of the equation. From this array
emanates the need for particular criteria of selection - an issue that has been the
concern of political theorists for quite some time, from Plato and Aristotle, Locke and
de Tocqueville, to Marx.
In the following section attention will be devoted to the electoral expenditures
incurred in other democracies. The states included in the comparison are India, Israel,
Australia and Mexico. Since the availability of information is a pre-condition for
comparison, the states included in this study were obvious selections with regard to
this criterion.
However, the selection of these states needs justification: First and foremost, the
availability of information with regard to electoral expenditures motivated the choice
of cases. Since the subject matter dealt with in the paper is rarely the concern of
scholarly debate and as a result of its nature perceived to be sensitive, the countries
referred to above - India, Israel, Australia and Mexico - are those where the relevant
information was readily available.
Secondly, with the exception of Mexico, all the other states (South Africa, India, Israel
and Australia) are former British colonies or protectorates.
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Other reasons for the selection of these states pertain to the difference in size, the
mixture of electoral systems and the fact that they are all developing democracies.
These selection criteria underlie an attempt to deal with rival hypotheses as to what
factors would explain the financial expenses incurred during the election process in all
of these states.
With regard to the electoral systems in use, both South Africa and Israel employ the
Party List Proportional System (see Garfinkle, 1996; State of Israel, 1998; Peretz and
Doron, 1997); India uses the First-Past- The-Post Plurality System (see Thakur, 1995;
Mehta, 1997); Mexico employs the Mixed-Member Proportional System (see
Centeno, 1994; CSIS, 1994; Weintraub, 1997), and in Australia, the Alternative Vote
Majority System is in use (see Farnsworth, 1997). In the case of Israel and South
Africa, voters choose from among party lists, and seats are awarded in proportion to
the vote received by each party. In India, the candidate that obtains more votes than
any other candidate is elected, even if that person may only have won a minority of
votes cast. Australian voters indicate an order of preference among the candidates
running for election. If no candidate obtains an outright majority, the last placed
candidate is removed, and the associated second-choice votes are added to the totals of
the remaining candidates. This process is repeated until a candidate secures a
majority. In Mexico the legislature consists of a block of seats that are elected by
plurality or majority from single-member districts, and another block of seats that are
elected in multi-member districts under a proportional system. The proportional seats
are awarded in such a way as to compensate for the disproportional effects produced
by the single-member district outcomes (Farnsworth, 1997; Peretz and Doron, 1997;
Thakur, 1995, Centeno, 1994; De Ville and Steytler, 1996; Faure, 1996).
The focus will now be placed on the cost of elections in different regions of the world
and the possible explanations for the costs incurred, before a particular focus will be
placed on the countries in question.
Hence, a comparative descriptive analysis of the electoral systems and concurrent cost
implications in India, Australia, Israel and Mexico will follow. It should be noted that
the tables provided on the vital election statistics of each of these states only reflect
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the relevant information which could be obtained from the respective electoral
commissions.
It is also imperative that cognisance should be taken with regards to the comparisons
drawn between the respective countries' electoral expenditure. The utilisation of the
purchasing power parity (PPP) rates of currency, as opposed to mere currency
exchange rates, would have provided a more realistic indication of the differences in
electoral expenditure between these different countries under discussion. (For a
discussion on PPP, see the Economist, 27 April 2000. Also visit the following
website for more information on PPP and other related topics:
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ102/merrill/fall97/chap6-10/sld073.htm. )
3.5.2 INDIA:
3.5.2.1 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
By far the most populous democracy in the world since 1952, India is a constitutional
democracy with a parliamentary system of government, committed to regular, free and
fair elections, (Electoral Commission of India, 1998; Reynold, Reilly and Asmal eds.
1997; Thakur, 1995:257). Any Indian citizen may contest the elections, and the only
requirement is a deposit of Rs 500.
The Constitution requires that the central parliament and state legislative assemblies
are to be elected at least every five years on the basis of universal adult suffrage.
Elections in India determine the composition of the government; the membership of
the two Houses of Parliament (the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha), the state and
union territory legislative assemblies, the Presidency and Vice-Presidency. India is
divided into 543 parliamentary constituencies, each of which returns one Member of
Parliament to the Lok Sabha (550 elected members and two additional members from
the Anglo-Indian community nominated by the President), the Lower House of the
Parliament (Electoral Commission of India, 1998).
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India's parliamentary government and first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system is a
legacy of British colonialism, which ended in 1947. The British introduced self-
government in stages and it was only at the end of colonial rule and with the adoption
of the Indian Constitution in 1950 by a Constituent Assembly that universal suffrage
was achieved. The choice of electoral system was fiercely debated by the Constituent
Assembly, before the first-past-the-post electoral system was chosen. Given the fact
that India is an extremely diverse and multi-ethnic society, proportional representation
as a possible electoral system attracted many advocates, but the need for stable
government and to avoid fragmented legislatures swung the decision in favour of
FPTP (Rangarajan & Patidar in Reynolds et al. (eds.), 1997).
An independent delimitation commissron - constituted of the Chief Election
Commissioner and two Judges from the Supreme or High Court - established by
Parliament, determines the shape and size of parliamentary constituencies. The size of
constituencies is, however, characterised by huge discrepancies, with the largest
having over 25,000,000 voters and the smallest less than 50,000. It is a state of
affairs brought about by a constitutional amendment of 1976, suspending delimitation
until after the census of 2001 (Electoral Commission of India, 1998). Apart from
having to delimit more than 500 parliamentary and over 3,000 state constituencies, the
independent Election Commission also has to organise and conduct national and state
elections, register all eligible voters, and establish procedures for the nomination of
candidates (Thakur, 1995:258).
3.5.2.2 INDIAN ELECTIONS
Since its independence in 1947 India generally had one national party and many
opposition parties with core support in only state or region. The Indian National
Congress Party (founded in 1885) has been the "power-house" of political parties in
Indian politics in terms of its capacity to field candidates in national elections (Thakur,
1995 :221-222).
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However, the political power map of Indian politics changed drastically after the 1996
elections, during which the political reign of the Congress Party was brought to an
abrupt end. The right-wing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged as the single
largest party in parliament for the first time. The long-dominant Congress Party
succeeded in collecting a mere 28 percent of the vote and lost 135 seats (from 274 to
139) in the 545-member Lower House, or Lok Sabha. Not only did this mean the end
of a one party dominance of Indian politics, but according to Mehta, it also signalled
the end of the upper-caste's political dominance of Indian politics (Mehta, 1997:56-
57).
The most striking feature of the election process in India is the enormous scale of the
exercise (see table 6). According to Thakur (1995:257) in 1989, when the voting age
was lowered from 21 to 18, another 36 million people were added to the electoral role.
The organisational complexity and scale that accompany these elections are evident
from the fact that in the 1996 elections to the Lok Sabha there were 1 269 candidates
from 38 officially recognised national and state political parties, 1 048 candidates
from registered political parties - but not personally recognised - and 10 635
independent candidates. The total number of the electorate was 590 257 288 and
almost 4 million people were employed by the Electoral Commission of India to run
the elections at a cost of approximately US $600 million (Electoral Commission of
India, 1998).
Elections to the Lok Sabha are conducted every five years. On the advice of the Prime
Minister, the President may dissolve the Lok Sabha before its term is over (as in 1971)
or when the President is convinced, as in 1991, that no stable government can be
formed (Rangarajan & Patidar, 1997). The members of the Rajya Sabha, or Upper
House, are elected indirectly (233 members and an additional 12 members nominated
by the President as representatives of science, art, literature and social services), rather
than by the citizens at large. Using the single transferable voting system, Rajya Sabha
members are elected by each state's Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly) and, unlike
most federal systems, the number of members returned by each state is roughly in
proportion to its population (Rangarajan and Patidar, 1997).
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TABLE 6: Statistics on the 1996 Indian Elections
US $ (where indicated)
Total number of Electorate 590 257 288
Number of People Employed by the ECI 4 000 000
Amount of Paper Consumed 25 000 tons
Number of Voting Booths 825 000
Cost of the Election *US $600 million
Average Cost per Voter US $1.00
(Source: Adapted Electoral Commission of India, 1998)
(*Calculated at JNR/US $ exchange rate in June 1996: 1US $=35,11 JNR)
It is thus clear to see that despite the enormity of the electoral process in India, at an
average per capita cost of only US $1.00, the Indian elections amount to one of the
least expensive similar undertakings in the world, including the developed
democracies of the world. To a large degree the Indian case demonstrates that
legitimacy does not equal expensive. Perhaps a case could be made that in general,
the larger the size of the electorate, the cheaper the average cost per vote would be.
3.5.3 AUSTRALIA:
3.5.3.1 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Australia is a parliamentary democracy, comprising a federation of six states in which
the legislative powers are divided between the bicameral Australian Federal
Parliament. The Australian Federation has a three-tier system of government which is
characterised by a separation of powers to provide the necessary checks and balances.
At the national level, and under the provisions set out by the Australian Constitution,
there are the Legislature, the Executive Government and the Judiciary, which are
responsible for all matters of national interest. At the State and Territory level, a
Legislature, Executive Government and Judiciary are responsible for matters
specifically relevant to the States and the Territories. Lastly, at the city, town and
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municipal level are approximately 900 local government bodies (Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994; Jarrett, 1998).
3.5.3.2 AUSTRALIAN ELECTIONS
A significant feature of the Australian electoral process is the use of two different
electoral systems, un1ike in the cases of South Africa, India, Israel and Mexico.
Preferential voting, which is relatively exclusive to Australia - since most similar
political systems employ the Simple Majority system - is used in elections for the
House of Representatives and all other State Lower Houses, apart from the Tasmanian
House of Assembly and the A.C.T. Legislative Assembly. Candidates with the fewest
preferences at any stage are eliminated from the count in tum, their second or later
preferences redistributed, until one candidate secures an overall majority. Each
member of the House of Representatives is elected for a Division, and must receive 50
percent plus one of the votes in a Division for election. In contrast, the system of
proportional voting (the single transferable vote) is used in the elections for the
Australian Senate and candidates do not need an absolute majority of formal votes in
order to be elected (Australian Electoral Commission, 1999; Roberts, 1986:54).
Representatives of smaller parties or independent candidates have a far better chance
of election to the Senate, as a result of the proportional representation system, than in
elections for the House of Representatives.
Voting is compulsory and all citizens over the age of 18 must enrol to vote.
Australians must ensure that they are enrolled in the electoral division in which they
live and computer records are kept of those who voted and failed to vote at federal
elections and referendums. A fine of up to $50 is set for those who fail to enrol and/or
vote (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1994).
Voters must indicate their preference for every candidate by marking their preferred
candidate with a one, then their second preference, and so on. A failure to do so will
result in a spoilt ballot, and thus the particular vote will not be counted. Compulsory
voting for federal elections was introduced in 1924 and first used in the 1925 elections
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where 91.31% of the electorate went to the polls. Only the following categories of
people are not entitled to enrol and vote:
(a) prisoners serving a sentence of five years or more;
(b) people who have been convicted of treason and not pardoned; and
(c) people who are certified as being mentally incapable of comprehending the nature
and significance of enrolment and voting (Farnsworth, 1997).
A final expenditure figure for the 1998 Federal Elections is not available at the present
time, as not all post-election tasks which will be credited to the elections (such as non-
voter action) have been completed (Australian Electoral Commission, 1999). As at 15
June 1999 the expenditure on the Federal elections was Au $61 737 070, excluding
Au $33 920 787 for public funding (see table 7). Using Close of Rolls enrolment (12
056 625) as the basis, the expenditure to 15 June 1999 per voter equates to Au $5.06
or Au $7.87 including public funding. Looking at the constant prices with March
1998 as the base, the average cost per voter has comparatively decreased since 1984
(Au $5.65); to 1990 ($4.84) and 1993 ($4.58) being the only time when the average
cost per elector was lower than that in 1998.
The 1998 Federal election expenditure as on 15 June was as follows:
TABLE 7: 1998 Australian Federal Election Expenditure
Au$
Sub-Total Au $61 737070
Public Funding Au $33 920 787
TOTAL Au $95 657 857
*(US $56 065 069)
Size of the Electorate 12056625
Average Cost per Vote Au $7.93
*(US $4.65)
(Source: Adapted from Australian Electoral Commission, 1999)
(*Calculated at US $/ AUD exchange rate in June 1998: 1US $=1, 7062AUD)
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The average cost per vote in the case of Australia (US $4.65) is on par with that spent
on the elections of the State ofIsrael (US $6.96). The election expenditure in Australia
and Israel both, however, exceed that oflndia to a ratio of 4: 1 and 6: 1 respectively. In
the case of Australia, the difference in election expenses as compared to those of
India, could be attributed to the high cost of the administration, including such items
as the allowances and training costs of polling officials, and the operational
administration costs.
A common denominator that seems to link the election expenditure of Australia,
South Africa and Israel is the high cost involved in the administration of these
elections. In particular this is valid of the money spent on the wages of the polling
officials and the administrative personnel.
3.5.4 THE STATE OF ISRAEL:
3.5.4.1 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
Located on the western shore of the Mediterranean, Israel lies at the crossroads of
three continents: Asia, Africa and Europe. Strangely enough, the State of Israel is a
country with no fixed borders. At the end of 1994, Israel's northern and eastern
borders were still largely in a state of flux. The issue of the Golan Heights was still
unresolved, with Israel occupying its "security zone" in Lebanon, and no decision had
been reached regarding the eventual international border between Israel and Palestine.
In comparison with its Middle East regional neighbours, Israel is a very small country
both area size (28 000 krrr') and population (5.3 million in 1994). Although larger
than Lebanon, Qatar, and Kuwait, the State of Israel is five times smaller than Jordan,
twenty times smaller than Iraq, and over one hundred times smaller than Saudi Arabia.
Despite its size, Israel has transformed itself into the principal economic power in the
Middle East region, and has traditionally attracted considerable attention from the
West since its independence in 1948 (Peretz and Doron, 1997).
The factors that have made Israel the centre of attraction to the West, are specifically
vested in: (1) The fact that Israel shares similar values with the West. Apart from
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being one of the most democratic countries in the Middle East, most of its political
and economic leadership have familial ties with the West, and many of whom are
products of the American and British tertiary education system; (2) lts conflict with
neighbouring Palestine over the Gaza strip; and, (3) The fact that Israel is the
birthplace of both Judaism and Christianity and the considerable importance it holds
for Islam too (Peretz and Doron, 1997:1-2; Garfinkle, 1997). The latter factor results
in events impacting on Israel are of major interest to the followers of these three
dogmas.
Israel is a non-liberal democracy with no written constitution, the basic values and
laws of which are deduced from a commitment to the interests of the Jewish people.
Its single-chamber parliament, the 120-member Knesset, serves as both a legislature
and a constitutional body. Regular laws and acts are drafted through the first function,
and basic laws embodied with constitutional status are enacted through the second
function. The Knesset also selects, approves, and supervises the operations of the
government (Peretz and Doron, 1997; The State ofIsrael, 1999).
The Israeli multi-party system is part of Israel's pre-state heritage. It evolved from
diverse ideological trends and interest groups within the Zionist movement. Until
1977, one party - the Mapai (later Ma'arach and Labour - dominated the system.
Since then political competition has been shaped and took place between two blocs:
(1) The left camp which controlled the government after the 1992 elections, consisting
of two elements, the Zionist parties and the Arab parties; and (2) the right camp,
composed of secular and religious elements which include two nationalist parties and
one ultra-nationalist party. Although very stable, the party system in Israel is in a
constant state of flux, constantly reshaping itself. The major political rivals of the
1930s, although now with different personalities, new institutions and orientations, are
still competing for power sixty years later (Peretz and Doron, 1997:70).
Political parties in Israel have become the principal interpreters and articulators of the
preferences of the electorate. Whenever groups or individuals want to improve their
economic or ethnic position, they will invariably be able to find at least one party with
a platform they can support. However, the importance of parties as vehicles to
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improve the social conditions of people are on the decrease as a result of the growth of
the national economy. As a consequence this is also increasing and fostering the
economic independence of the voting public (Peretz and Doron, 1997:71-72).
3.5.4.2 ISRAELI ELECTIONS:
The Israeli electoral system is based on the Basic Law: the Knesset of 1958 and the
Knesset Elections Law of 1969. Since the Parties Law of 1992 was passed, only
registered parties may present a list of candidates and participate in the elections
(Capitanchik, 1996:450). Elections to the Knesset are supposed to take place every
four years. However, the Knesset may decide by an simple majority to dissolve itself
and call for early elections. Elections to the second (1951), fifth (1961), tenth (1981),
eleventh (1984), thirteenth (1992) and fourteenth (1996) Knessets were all held before
the due date. As in the case of the delayed elections to the eight Knesset in 1973,
because of the Yom Kippur War, the Knesset is also empowered to decide to prolong
its term beyond four years (The State of Israel, 1998).
Elections for the Knesset, which are based on a vote for a party rather than for
individuals, and the election of the Prime Minister, are held at the same time. As in
the case of South Africa, the country constitutes a single electoral constituency and all
citizens are eligible to vote from age 18. Since the elections to the 14th Knesset,
elections for the Knesset and the Prime Minister are held simultaneously. On election
day voters cast two secret ballots; one for the Prime Minister and another for a
political party to represent them in the Knesset (The State of Israel, 1999; Peretz and
Doron, 1997:118-121).
Knesset seats are assigned, as in the case of South Africa, in proportion to each party's
percentage of the total national vote. A party's surplus votes, insufficient for an
additional seat, are redistributed among the various parties according to their
proportional size, or as agreed between parties prior to the elections. The only
limitation is the 1.5% threshold, which means that in order to get elected to the
Knesset a party should receive a minimum of 1.5% of the total votes on election day
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(Capitanchik, 1996). A Treasury allocation for election campaigns is granted to each
party based on its number of seats in the outgoing Knesset. New political parties
receive a similar allocation retroactively for each member elected to the Knesset. The
State Comptroller reviews the disbursement of all campaign expenditures (The State
of Israel, 1999).
Public financing of political parties is a source of constant debate, especially among
the smaller parties. The legislation that provides for the financing of the activities of
political parties during and between elections, is the Party Financing Law of 1973.
The principle underlying this law is very simple: the bigger the party, the more money
it receives from the State. This has the effect that large parties and veteran parties are
being disproportionately favoured with regard to available financial resources with
which to conduct their respective election campaigns. Consequently, veteran parties
and large parties are also favoured with regard to the effective application of the free.
time granted to them by the election law on the national radio and television
broadcaster. New political parties receive ten minutes of free television time and
twenty-five minutes of free radio time during the last month before an election.
(According to the election law, political advertising may only commence during the
last month before an election.) On the other hand, veteran parties receive the same
amount of radio and television time, plus six minutes for each of their members who
are Members of the Knesset. Large and established political parties are thus
structurally and legally favoured at the expense of small and new parties (Peretz and
Doron, 1997: 129-131).
Election day is a national holiday, and free transportation is available to voters who
happen to be outside their polling districts that day. Polling stations are provided for
military personnel, hospital patients, and prisoners, as well as for merchant seamen
and Israelis on assignment abroad. The Central Election Committee is responsible for
conducting the elections. This Committee is headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court
and includes representatives of the political parties holding Knesset seats (Peretz and
Doron, 1997).
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Since a breakdown of the costs incurred in the Israeli elections was not available at the
time, a table is provided with other vital statistics on the 1996 elections:
TABLE 8: Statistics on the 1996 Israeli Elections
Average Cost per Vote
3933250Number of Eligible Voters
NIS 86 799 000
*(US $26 334 816)
US $6.69
US $ (where indicated)
Total Budget of the 1996 Campaign
(Source: Adapted from The State of Israel, 1999)
(*Calculated at US $/NIS exchange rate in June 1996: 1US $=3,2956 NIS)
The election amounted to an average of US $6.69 per vote, and although very
expensive in comparison to the Indian case, it is still far less expensive than the South
African one. A significant lesser amount (US $27 962) was spent on allowing Israeli
citizens, finding themselves outside of the country on the day of the election to vote,
than in the Australian case (US $2 206 106).
3.5.5 THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES: THE MEXICAN ELECTIONS OF
1994
3.5.5.1 THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM
It needs to be explained why a focus will be placed on Mexico's 1994 elections. As in
the case of India's 1996 elections, the Mexican elections of 1994 marked a watershed
in Mexican politics. In both cases the parties that have been obliterating their political
opposition and have dominated the politics in these two countries for decades, lost
most of their support base. The governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRJ) in
Mexico failed to obtain an outright majority, and India's Congress Party was ousted as
the ruling party in Indian politics. Thus the emphasis on the 1994 elections is borne
from its political and symbolic significance to the history and future development of
politics in Mexico (Centeno, 1994; CSIS,1994).
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Under its 1917 Constitution, Mexico is a federal republic with separation of powers.
The bicameral Congress comprises the Senate and a Chamber of Deputies, with the
President having sweeping governmental powers in nearly all fields. However, the
Constitution forbids a second consecutive term of office for any elected official. The
effect is that it compromises the accountability of elected officials to the electorate.
Mexico's independence was first proclaimed on September 16, 1810, and the Federal
Republic established in 1824. Often called unique or contradictory, the Mexican
regime presents something of a hybrid that has always been difficult to categorise
within the traditional notions of democracy and authoritarianism. According to
Centeno (1994:32-33), Mexico may best be understood as an "electoral-bureaucratic"
authoritarian regime. The monopolistic series of electoral victories by the PRI for
nearly sixty years is a clear indication of the relatively minor role performed by
elections in determining the composition of government. Ultimate political control is
exercised within a civilian bureaucracy that employs electoral mechanisms to co-opt
opposition and legitimate its continuity in power (Centeno, 1994; "Mexico Index",
1998; La Botz, 1995).
3.5.5.2 MEXICAN ELECTIONS
The struggle for democracy in Mexico has not been an easy one. For more than 25
years since 1968, peasants, workers, the urban poor, students, feminists and
environmentalists built important social movements that fought for democracy and
social justice. Not only has the struggle been for free and fair elections, but also for
human rights and civil rights, which - according to Dan La Botz (1995) - was
highlighted by the Chiapas rebellion of January 1994. The rebellion also signalled the
beginning of the end for Mexico's traditional governing party, the PRI. At the centre
of this struggle for democracy in Mexico were four movements: the Zapatista Army of
National Liberation (EZLN) which led the rebellion in Chiapas; the National
Democratic Convention originally convened by the EZLN; the Civic Alliance - the
new movement of Mexican civil society - and the opposition party of the Democratic
Revolution (PDR) (Radu, 1997:118).
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The EZLN has transformed Mexican politics. On 27 January 1994 with the world's
attention focused on Mexico, the then President Salinas was forced to sign a formal
pact with the opposition parties, conceding a series of much needed electoral reforms
for the elections that were due for August in that same year. The agreement called for
impartial electoral authorities, media equity, no use of public money for private
campaigning, and definite limits on campaign spending (La Botz, 1995: 10).
Mexican elections are traditionally described as corrupt and fraudulent, and have been
characterised by a genuine lack of conditions for truly free and fair elections (Basanez,
1995:643). According to La Botz, "To win elections, the PRJ was prepared to use its
political machine, the state's economic resources, the domination of the media, the
presence of the military, police violence and massive fraud." (La Botz, 1995:130)
Between 1988 and 1994 some 286 political assassinations were documented. The PRJ
party officials, police, or hired gangsters were directly responsible for many of these
286 murders. Not only did the PRJ's use of violence secure elections for the party, it
also terrorised the opposition. However, the PRJ's shameless use of patronage, fraud
and violence to win elections had a paradoxical effect on internal politics within
Mexico, causing resentment among many Mexicans and gradually led to a revival of
the civil society movement (La Botz, 1995).
The outcome of Mexican elections has never varied for more than sixty years. The
PRJ invariably won the elections, with modest exceptions in some local elections.
This has led Sarmiento (1997: 131) to conclude that Mexican elections have for long
been a mere theoretical exercise, with no practical value.
After the scandal surrounding the PRJ's "abduction" of the 1988 election, constant
pressure was exerted on the State for electoral reforms. These pressures had two
sources: that which arose from citizens within Mexico, and that which came from the
United States Administration. Both the demands of Mexican reformers and the
influence of the United States assisted to bring about electoral amendments in Mexico
(La Botz, 1995: 194).
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Firstly, there were reforms in the government structure to increase the role played by
minority parties. The Congress doubled the size of the Senate from 64 to 128, and
granted the largest minority party in any state one seat. Secondly, no party was
permitted to hold more than 63% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies. This was
implemented to prevent a single party from changing the Constitution. Thirdly, the
famous governability law, which gave the largest party an automatic majority, was
repealed so that any party with less than a majority would have to form coalitions (La
Botz, 1995: 198).
In 1990, the PRl passed through Congress a new electoral code (COFIPE). These
reforms dealt with a range of issues, from the actual act of voting, to the tabulation of
results, and the final adjudication of decisions. The new Mexican Electoral Institute
(IFE) was to administer the new reformed system. Theoretically, the state and the
district citizen councillors (who also were given the responsibility by the new law to
validate the election) - the IFE advisors - were independent, though in practice,
according to La Botz, they were often PRl sympathisers (La Botz, 1995).
The Federal Electoral Institute was established as a permanent, autonomous and
professional administration, with officials who ought to be non-partisan and
independent of the government. According to La Botz (1995), the IFE however tended
to resemble the PRl establishment, since many of its staff came from the government
service. More strikingly though, IFE also remained under the control of the Ministry
of the Interior, which had for decades served the official party as "political enforcer".
Elections in Mexico are held for President, the Senate (Cámera de Senadores), and the
Chamber of Deputies (Cámera de Diputadosy, Governors, state legislatures, and
municipal councils. Federal elections for the President take place every six years;
every three years for the Chamber of Deputies, and Senate elections every three years
where half of the Senate is elected for six year terms. State elections for the Governor
also take place every six years, every three years for the State Deputies, and every
three years for municipal councils (Lindvall-Larson, 1996).
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Prior to all elections, the IFE used to spend millions of pesos to conduct a public
education campaign. Television public service announcements, newspaper
advertisements, billboards, and posters exhorted the electorate to participate in the
elections. In January 1994 the General Council decided that the total public funding
for the election would be set at US $67 million, of which approximately US $33.1
million went to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), US $9.7 million went to
the right-wing populist National Action Party (PAN), and the ex-communist Party of
Democratic Revolution (PRD) received US $6.9 million. The rest of the money was
divided among the other smaller parties participating in the election (La Botz,
1995: 199; "Mexico Index", 1998). Presidential campaign expenditures were also
limited and could not exceed US $42 million. The PRI spent close to the US $42
million limit on their presidential campaign, between ten and twenty times the size of
its nearest competition. As in the case of the 1999 elections in South Africa, where
the ANC enjoyed a massive resource advantage over the opposition during the
election process, the PRI similarly enjoyed the same advantage.
Political parties were free to spend as much of their budget as they wished on
television, radio and newspaper advertising. Reforms were passed requiring the
national broadcasting network to give each participating party 15 minutes of free
television and radio coverage each month prior to the election. To ensure that the
contest was fair, restrictions were placed on advertising for government social welfare
programmes. Even with the measures in place to secure a fair contest, irregularities
still seemed to plague the Mexican election process. The PRI received 43% of the
total air time given to political parties, while the PAN received 14% and the PRD
13%. The results were similar for the Presidential candidates: the PRI candidate
received 41% (22% for Colosio before his assassination, and then 19% to his
successor Zedillo who, as a result, became known as the "accidental President"),
whereas the PAN and PRD presidential candidates only received 19% and 11% of air
time respectively (La Botz, 1995 :200; Radu, 1997: 121).
Two other plaguing problems that used to characterise Mexican elections were polling
and ballot box fraud. To prevent them from recurring, the 1990 electoral code
provided that polling places would be geographically dispersed. Throughout the
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whole of Mexico 95 000 precincts were established in 1994. Restrictions were also
placed on campaigning in or near polling stations. Another perennial problem of
Mexican elections was repeat voting or the "carousel". In order to curb this practice a
new registration list was drawn up and special voter identification cards issued. The
new national voter registration list eventually contained the names of over 45 million
persons (see table 9). Before election day, the IFE issued voter identification cards to
45,796,851 citizens (La Botz, 1995:201; "1994 Presidential and Legislative
Elections", 1998).
However, less than a month before the elections were due, the PRD raised a number
of objections with the General Council with regard to the integrity of the new voter
registration list. These related to potentially fraudulent registrations, illustrated by the
high rate of homonyms or voters who had the same first and last two names appearing
on the new list. In the Federal District, amongst its 4.3 million registered voters, the
list contained over one million homonyms. Further claims insinuated that 17% of the
total voting population had been eliminated from the list and that a large number of
false registrations appeared on the list. The list, however was approved, with the IFE
rejecting all of the PRD's claims (La Botz, 1995).
Attempts at ridding the elections of potential fraud were taken a step further with the
introduction of voter registration cards. The newly issued voter registration cards
contained several safety features, including a photograph of the voter, a bar code, a
thumbprint, watermarks, signatures, and molecular-fusion card construction. There
were also special homonym security codes installed in the cards to deal with this quite
distinctive Mexican phenomenon and at the same time to deal with one of the
practices characteristic of previous Mexican elections: multiple voting. For this
reason too, each voter registration card was punched after its holder had cast his/her
vote. A specially formulated indelible ink that was clearly visible and impossible to
remove with any solvent, was also used to stain each voter's thumb when casting a
vote. Ballot boxes and booths were redesigned, with party representatives, non-
governmental observers, and foreign observers all permitted to witness the opening of
the ballot boxes and the counting ofthe vote (La Botz, 1995).
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The post-election debate was characterised by conflicting reports whether or not the
process was free and fair. However, it was certain that these were the most free and
fair elections in the history of Mexico.
TABLE 9: Statistics on the 1994 Mexican Presidential and Legislative Elections
US $ (where indicated)
Size of the Electorate 45796817
Voter Turnout 35552 069
Number of Election Monitors 21 000
Number of Foreign Observers 800
Amount of Public Funding *US $67 million
222 105 000 MXP
Total Election Expenditure *US $1 billion
3.3150 billion MXP
Estimated Cost per Vote *US $22.00
72.93 MXP
(Sources: Adapted from: "1994 Presidential and Legislative Elections", 1998; La
Botz, 1995; CSIS, 1994)
(*Calculated at US $/MXP exchange rate in June 1994: 1US $=3,3150 MXP)
3.6 CONCLUSION
It was established that inflated election expenditures are the result of mainly two
considerations: the administrative and the capacity-building elements.
Originally aimed at reducing the overall costs, the introduction of new technology in
the electoral process has proven itself prone to result in the opposite. It is evident,
from looking at the 1999 expenditure in the South African elections, that it was a
combination of the latter factor and the lack of sufficient administrative planning that
greatly inflated the financial costs of the elections.
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The little time at the disposal of the Electoral Commission in which to plan and
conduct the 1999 elections, also played a major part in the adoption of the
technological route taken by the Commission (Personal interview with Deon Du Plooy
from the EC, 2000). Perplexing though is that the experience of the 1994 elections, in
which the electoral commission also had very little time in which to plan and
administer the elections, did not result in better time management and planning for the
1999 elections. The task of the Commission was further complicated by the
resignation of Judge Kriegler and the debate regarding the allocation of funds to the
activities of the Commission.
With better administrative planning of the electoral process a large percentage of these
expenses could have been obviated. Whether one would be erroneous in concluding
that the EC was set on making the elections a lavish affair, marked by technological
gimmicks, is certainly open to debate. What cannot be denied though is that a close
inspection and evaluation of the areas of costs incurred is necessary, and that ways
need to be sought to make the electoral and voting process a financially less painful
one for the South African taxpayer.
The difference in the per capita expenditure between the South African elections and
those of Israel, Australia, Mexico and India is not difficult to explain. All of these
countries have permanent electoral management bodies (EMBs). In none of these
countries have elections been conducted as part of a broader on-going peacekeeping
operation. The case of Mexico, however, needs special consideration since it was the
first time in the history of Mexican politics that considerable attempts were made to
ensure that the elections were conducted in a free and fair manner (CSIS, 1994). The
considerable amount of money spent on the Mexican elections was as a direct result of
its being the first time ever that electoral reforms and measures were put in place to
conduct free and fair elections.
Another difference between these cases is the excessive use of technology in the South
African case. According to Baxter (Interview, 6 September 1999), the EC spent
millions of rands on its results reporting system, which ultimately did not produce the
intended outcome, as it took the EC no less than five to compute the election result.
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Evidently, the EC has neglected putting into practice the most important lesson in
election administration, namely that the goal should be to deliver an election that
meets the needs of the country within the means at its disposal. If the results obtained
from using sophisticated technology do not live up to its intended outcome, it would
very much appear as if investment in such technology is a waste of money and
resources (IFES, UN-DESA and IDEA, 1999). The lesson learned from the election
experiences in especially India is quite revealing: simple processes cost less.
Common to all these case studies is the notion whether or not the State should fund
political parties during elections. The following chapter highlights the importance of
political parties to any democracy and also focuses on the main arguments regarding
the issue of funding.
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CHAPTER4
State Funding of Political Parties
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with a number of issues. Firstly, it deals with the pivotal role
played by political parties in modem day democratic politics. It concentrates on the
funding of political parties by the State in order to enable them to participate in the
election process in a competitive framework. Focus is also placed on the types of
funding political parties may receive and the implications; and it deals with the
contention whether or not it is the responsibility and duty of the national government
to fund the operations of political parties with money received from the taxpayer. It
is, therefore, with this contention in mind that party funding is seen as part of the
election cost.
4.2 PARTY FUNDING
The following discussion on the role of political parties in the democratic political
process of a state is important in the context of the recommendations suggested in
Chapter 6 with regard to reducing the financial costs of the electoral and voting
process. It is from this discussion that the rationale for the funding of political parties
will proceed.
According to a report by the South African Committee for Constitutional Affairs,
political parties are defined as those organisations "registered in terms of the law
addressing a wide appeal and more specific interests, with the objective of securing
power or participation within. the legislative and administrative organs of government
through the electoral process," and as a consequence they are important participants in
any political system, whether the system is democratic, totalitarian or authoritarian.
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They fulfil a crucial role in the formulation and implementation of government policy,
(Committee for Constitutional Affairs, 1992:7).
According to Ware (1987), political parties have emerged as key political actors in
almost every state in the modem world. Their importance in political systems of
various kinds since the late nineteenth century contributed to their being a central
concern of political analysts. Ware (1987) posits that it is thus "no coincidence that it
was on political parties that Lowel, Bryce, Ostrogorski and Michels produced the first
books that could be described as genuine political science."
Democracy, according to popular contention, cannot function without political parties.
Modem democratic politics equate party politics. Therefore, political parties perform
an important role in representing and articulating the demands and wishes of the
people. In terms of this contention, representation of the people can only be effected
by the election of representatives, which again hinges on the existence of political
parties. They are thus major role players in the political system connecting the
citizenry and the governmental process (Randall, 1988:190). Political parties tum the
demands and wishes of citizens into political issues. They form governments and act
as opposition in legislatures (Klingemann; Hoffebert and Budge, 1994:1-5). Political
parties are, therefore, indispensable institutions in a democracy.
Although political parties are considered to be key actors/elements in liberal
democracies, their role as instruments of popular control and civic orientation is,
however, challenged by new social movements, interest groups and the media
(Pridham, ed.; 1990). It is thus logical to conclude that the manner in which political
parties articulate and orientate themselves would be the product or result of particular
historical experiences. The extent to which political parties adjust to the changes and
challenges from their particular environment will determine their survival.
Historically, parties came into being because of conflicting interests, namely newly
emerging interests versus interests threatened by the forces of democratic change
during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Roberts, 1986:72). Political
parties, as suggested by the derivation of the word, are partisan. They are committed
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
66
to a particular cause or ideology, and are opposed to the programmes and ideologies of
rival parties. Parties thus tend to come into being on the basis of some cleavage
which society perceives to be politically significant. As a result the differences among
modem political parties could be traced to the social cleavages dominant at the time of
their inception (Klingemann et al, 1994:5-7).
South Africa's first political party, the Afrikaner Bond, came into being in the then
Cape Colony in 1883 under J.H. Hofmeyr. In the Afrikaner Bond both elements of the
white population (Afrikaners and English) found a political voice. The subsequent
exclusion of black South Africans from the political process at the formation of the
Union in 1910, led to the formation of the first black political movement, the South
African Native National Congress in 1912. In 1923 the Congress changed its name to
the African National Congress (ANC). (See Venter, 1998 regarding the development
of political parties in South Africa).
There are three main sources from which political parties could draw their funds. The
first way is through State funding. This refers to formal public financial support to
political parties by means of legislation with a range of mechanisms devised or built in
to ensure accountability, equity and proportionality. The second source of funding is
private contributions. These are funds that parties secure through individual
membership fees and corporate contributions. Finally, funds could be obtained from
foreign sources. These are moneys received by political parties from entities outside
the borders of the relevant state.
The funding of political parties in South Africa is entirely unregulated. Private donors
may support a political party in secret, and in the same vein so may foreign
governments or businesses. Regulations concerning campaign financing could
broadly be divided into two categories:
(a) Regulations concerning expenditure; and
(b) Regulations concerning contributions and other forms of income.
The first category of regulations are intended to prevent political parties from
"buying" voters during elections, whereas the latter category is intended to prevent
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those with money from "buying" candidates or parties. These regulations may include
some form of limitations or prohibitions on specific or total amounts of expenditure or
contributions, or they may merely require disclosure (Katz in LeDuc et al. (eds.),
1996:124-125).
4.2.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN SYSTEM OF PARTY FUNDING
Public funding of political parties, as comparative international experience has shown,
has been implemented to serve different purposes (The National Democratic Institute
For International Affairs, 1998:8). These purposes are twofold. The first serves to
focus support on the elections by giving political parties up-front grants or
reimbursing them financially for expenses incurred during the electoral process. The
second objective is to provide political parties with the necessary resources to
participate in parliamentary politics.
Apart from Section 236 of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa that
calls for national legislation to provide for the funding of political parties participating
in national and provincial legislatures on an equitable and proportional basis, the
funding of political parties is presently entirely unregulated. Many parties thus rely on
private funding in order to survive. Furthermore, each Member of Parliament (MP)
receives an annual special "constituency fund" to "remain in contact" with voters.
Because of the above Constitutional provision, government bears a constitutional
responsibility to provide financial support for political parties on the basis of the dual
principles of proportionality and equity. lts main provisions are:
• The establishment of a multi-party democracy fund, that will be credited with
money appropriated by Parliament from State coffers, domestic and foreign
contributors, and interests derived from the investment of money standing to the
credit of the fund;
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• The EC will administer the fund and appoint their head of administration as
accounting officer to control the fund, keep proper financial records, and prepare
annual statements and a balance sheet of its liabilities and assets to Parliament.
The Auditor General will audit the accounts and the balance sheets;
• The President may at times intervene to make pay-outs, after consulting the
constitutional review committee and the Electoral Commission (Parliamentary
Whip, 23 May 1997:5).
The allocations from the fund are to be made and paid out to each of the political
parties concerned on the basis of proportionality and equity. Ninety percent of the
fund is allocated in proportion to the number of seats held by each party in the
National Assembly and the provincial legislatures jointly. The other 10% is allocated,
firstly, among the provinces in proportion to the number of members in each province,
and secondly, it is divided equally among the participating parties in the legislature of
each province (Pottie, 1999:22-23). The implication is that only parties represented in
Parliament are financed. This raises some serious questions with regard to the fairness
of political party competition in South Africa, and also with regard to the accessibility
that smaller parties may have to contest the national elections and who may lack funds
in order to compete on a fair basis with other parties.
4.2.2 AMOUNTS RECEIVED BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1994
In total R53 million (R44 million was voted from State funds with an additional RIO
million by the European Union, of which Rl million was retained pending proof of
proper expenditure by political parties) was paid out to political parties in 1994.
Payment was done by the lEC in accordance with the provisions set out in Section 74
of the Electoral Act. The money was then distributed in three phases - one half before
the elections, based on the party's probable support; one-quarter after, on an equal
footing; and a final quarter, based on votes earned during the election, (Parliamentary
Whip, 23 May 1997:5-6). The amounts were as follow:
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
69
TABLE 10: State Funding of Political Parties in the 1994 National Elections
Party Amount Received
ANC R13.5 million
NP R7.7 million
IFP R6.6 million
FF R5.6 million
DP R5.5 million
PAC R5.4 million
ACDP R3.3 million
Africa Muslim Party R956 000
Federal Party R682 000
Equal Rights Party R546 000
Workers' List Party R546 000
Women's Rights Peace Party R136 000
Islamic Party R136 000
African Democratic Movement R136 000
Dikwankwetla Party R136 000
(Source: Parliamentary Whip, 23 May 1997:5)
Immediately following the April 1994 elections, in its post -election report to
Parliament, the IEC informed government of the "controversy" regarding the funding
of political parties. This included mainly two aspects: Whether such funding should
be provided by the State and, if so, to what extent should there be public scrutiny of
and/or control of public funds (Pottie, 1999).
4.2.3 PARTY FUNDING IN 1999
Since 1994, the legislative context governing party financing has changed to the extent
that a shift has taken place from "funding for registered political parties to funding
only represented political parties" (Pottie, 1999:22). Thus in 1999 the R53 million
from public funds was allocated as follows:
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TABLE 11: State Funding of Political Parties in the 1999 National Elections
Party Amount Allocated (in R)
ANC 30608560
NNP 10 145260
IFP 5694850
FF 1 993 330
DP 1 759600
PAC 1 125 190
ACDP 953470
Minority Front 719740
(Source: Pottie, 1999:23)
New political parties raised their objections to this legislation and voiced their
objections against the current system of funding of political parties at the "33 New
Party Press Conference" on 23 March 1999 in Tsakane, Gauteng. Their objections
were unsuccessful in changing the previous decision taken to fund only political
parties represented in Parliament. They also used the conference as a platform to
launch their various party manifestos (Pottie, 1999). The question of whether or not
the current legislative arrangements fulfil the State's constitutional responsibilities
remains open for debate.
4.3 THE REGISTRATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 1999
Another issue that met with opposition - in particular from small political parties -
were the registration fees political parties had to submit if they wished to participate in
the elections. This firstly raised questions as to whether or not so many small political
parties would be detrimental to the state of the country's democracy, and secondly
whether or not the payment of a deposit impeded the democratic right of any
individual to contest for government power. Weighing up the practical implications to
ideological considerations seemed to be the essence of the matter.
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By 3 May 1999 all the political parties wishing to enter the elections had to pay the
required deposit and submit their candidate lists. Each party had to pay RI00 000 to
participate in the national elections and R20 000 for every province in which it wished
to contest the elections (EISA, 1999: 1). The deposits were refundable in the event of
the particular party gaining one or more seats in the elections in which it participated.
Of the 26 parties paying the deposit, 16 contested for the National Assembly elections
(of these 16 parties, 15 contested for the provincial elections, 100f which contested
for seats in every provincial legislature). Five parties failed to pay the deposits, as
required by law and were, therefore, excluded from the final list of parties that
contested the June polls. According to Mchunu, the Ee had "no option but to exclude
these parties from the final order of the ballot... (W)e have no option but to follow the
letter of the law ..." (EISA, 1999).
As posited earlier, this issue of registration fees for political parties raised certain
questions pertaining to the extent that this financial deposit may impede the right of
any individual or group of individuals to form a political party and contesting in an
election for control over the machinery of the State. Ultimately the practical
implications need to be considered of having a myriad of small and insignificant
political parties contesting for State power. Extending the right to form and organise a
political party without applying certain measures of constraint may just have a
paradoxical effect within the South African democratic political context. The
proliferation of small political parties might prove to be the very threat to the system it
is supposed to uphold.
In essence though, the latter evaluation is indicative of a general bias against smaller
political parties in many democratic societies. For, if democracy entails the right to
the articulation of the needs of different interest groups in society, and if it requires the
expression of a certain degree of tolerance towards differences of opinion, then it is
contended that the compulsory requirement of paying registration fees is an
undemocratic practice.
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4.4 CONCLUSION:
Although their role as the sole articulator of the public's political interests and needs
is challenged by other social movements, political parties remain one the defining
characteristics of modem democratic politics. Political parties are key political actors
in almost every modem state. They fulfil a crucial role in the formulation and
implementation of government policy and are, therefore, crucial institutions in any
democracy.
Political parties draw their funds from essentially three sources. They obtain these
through private contributions, State funding, and foreign sources. In many instances,
as is the case in South Africa, the funding of political parties is totally unregulated.
Regulations regarding party funding could take the form of prohibitions on specific or
total amounts of expenditure, or they could require full disclosure.
The debate about the State funding of political parties during elections is due to
remain a contentious issue, generating heated debate on both sides of the spectrum of
the debate. There are those who believe that political parties perform an indispensable
role within a democracy and as such their survival needs to be secured in some or
other way. On the other hand, there are those who believe that the State funding of
political parties unfairly benefit those established parties to the detriment of new and
smaller political parties. As a consequence they argue for government to cease the
funding of political parties altogether.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
73
CHAPTER5
Concluding Remarks and Suggestions to curb Electoral Expenses
5.1 INTRODUCTION:
It is evident that South Africa cannot afford to spend a disproportionate amount of
money on conducting its elections. As posited earlier, the biggest threat to democracy
in the country will not arise from conducting cheaper elections, but from the majority
of people in whose socio-economic needs the government cannot provide because of
certain financial constraints. It is imperative though that the call for conducting
cheaper elections should not be interpreted as questioning the legitimacy of the
electoral process. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, deals with the ways in
which electoral spending could be reduced without negatively impacting on the
legitimacy of the voting process.
The following suggestions are intended to be as practical as possible to implement,
without compromising the free and fair element of the election process. They are not
intended to reflect negatively on any individuals or institutions in particular, but are
aimed at saving South Africa much needed funds.
5.2 SCALING DOWN THE FUNCTIONS OF THE EC:
Tom Lodge (1999: 18-20) addresses the issue of cost reduction by focusing on the
functions of the EC, as set out in the South African Constitution. The Constitution
charges the EC to manage national, provincial and local government elections, to
calculate their results and to ensure that the elections are free and fair. The EC thus
administers, supervises, monitors and evaluates the entire electoral process.
As a consequence the Electoral Commission Act of 1996 authorised the establishment
of a substantial bureaucracy to fulfil this mammoth task. According to Lodge (1999),
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the EC in its full deployment constitutes an organisation equal in size to most
Southern African governments. However, it is only active for between two and three
weeks during a year, including registration and election procedures.
Questions pertaining to the EC's independence are often raised, since it is very
difficult to draw a distinction between the EC and other organs of the South African
government. The majority of the local election officers employed by the EC are civil
servants. They are recruited as a result of the lack of persons with the necessary
managerial and administrative experience in many of the required areas. These staff
members are remunerated by the EC for the duties they undertake on its behalf. From
this follows the first suggestion to curb electoral expenses: The local management of
elections should be included among the normal duties of such functionaries (civil
servants in local governments), who are in effect paid for by their municipal
employers (Lodge, 1999: 18-19).
Similarly, this raises the issue of whether or not the EC really needs to organise the
whole of the registration process on its own. The public reacted favourably to the
involvement of civil servants during the first round of the 1999 registration process.
There was no evidence of any public perception that their involvement "subverted the
integrity of the process." Voter registration could, therefore, become a routine
government function (Lodge, 1999: 19). Much time and money could be saved by
making voter registration a formality, which could be completed at official
institutions, such as pension offices, schools and colleges, at prisons, at police
stations, and at post offices.
The EC should not be undertaking or be paying for the running of the elections. The
most critical role of the EC is to serve as a guarantor of electoral fairness and
competence, monitoring the performance of public officials responsible for such tasks.
Performing these functions does not require a huge bureaucracy. It requires a much
smaller, less expensive body with a well-developed capacity for collecting and
analysing information (Lodge, 1999). In the final analysis the EC should be "a
commission, a watchdog, (and) not a parallel state."
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5.3 CEASE STATE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES:
The primary functions of funding, according to Vicky Randall (1988), are to provide
political parties with the necessary resources to participate in the elections, in other
words to finance their campaigns, and to maintain their organisation. At issue,
however, is whether or not the taxpayer should be the primary supplier of this funding.
In the South African context, this function (with reference to State funding of political
parties) only extends to those parties already occupying seats in parliament. The
rationale that State funding serves to benefit small parties in competing for State
power, therefore, does not completely ring true. As Ware (1987: 18) indicated, State
funding is indeed only beneficial in maintaining the status quo as it primarily serves
the interests of big parties. A party such as the United Democratic Movement (UDM)
that received absolutely no State funding, gained more than 3% of the national vote.
In the process it fared better than some of the parties that received State funding (see
tables 12 & 13).
TABLE 12: Funding received by Parties and the Votes obtained at the Polls
Party Amount Received Number of Votes % of Total
(in Rand) Votes
*Pan Africanist 1 125 190 113 125 0.71
Congress (PAC)
*Freedom Front 1 993 330 127217 0.80
(FF)
*African 953470 228975 1.43
Christian
Democratic Party
(ACDP)
*Minority Front 719740 48277 0.30
(MF)
Total 4791 730 517594 3.24
(Source: Adapted from lEC, 1999)
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
76
TABLE 13: Parties that did not receive State Funding and their Support at the Polls
Party Amount Received Number of Votes % of National
(in Rand) Votes
Abolition of None 10611 0.07
Income Tax and
Usury Party
(AITUP)
*Azanian Peoples None 27257 0.17
Organisation
(AZAPO)
*Afrikaner None 46292 0.9
EenheidsBeweging
(AEB)
*Freedom Alliance None 86704 0.54
(FA)
The Government None 9 193 0.06
by the People
Green Party
(GPGP)
Socialist Party of None 9062 0.06
Azania (SOPA)
*United None 546790 3.42
Democratic
Movement (UDM)
United Christian None 125280 0.78
Democratic Party
(UCDP)
Total None 861189 5.39
(Source: Adapted from IEC, 1999)
(*Parties that secured seats in Parliament)
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According to Alan Ware (1987: 18-19), State funding is crucial for a number of
reasons:
1. Itmay free political parties from the grip of special interests;
2. Although not removing interests groups from exerting their influence on politics,
it allows political parties to focus their operations on rather different political
arenas;
3. It contributes to creating a rough equality between parties in terms of resources
with which they have to compete for the people's vote;
4. If this funding is linked to the share of the vote a party receives, as in the South
African case, in effect it helps to protect current large political parties; and
5. If political parties could rely on funding from the state, party leaders may afford to
be more insulated from the influences of local branches.
The contention of this proposal is that especially the latter "advantage" of State
funding leaves little incentive for political parties to really broaden their support base,
and party members, as a result, will start to playa less decisive role.
The assertion of this paper is fairly straightforward: cease the state funding of political
parties' electoral activities. This contention does not to deny that money plays a
pivotal role in the political process, and that political parties need money to survive.
Political parties are clearly important to representative democracy, and as a
consequence money is important in sustaining political parties and also democracy.
However, a considerable amount of money could be saved should the State funding of
political parties participating in the election process be terminated, with the proviso
that legislation be put in place to strictly regulate the external or private sources of
party funding.
More than R50 million was spent on financing the election activities of political
parties during the 1999 national elections. The issue at hand is thus whether or not
the State, or in effect the taxpayer, should be responsible for subsidising the election
activities of political parties. Since only those parties with seats in parliament benefit
from existing legislation, State funding would make no real decisive difference in
recruiting electoral support. This was seen in the June 1999 elections where the
minority parties who did not receive any State funding, collectively performed
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considerately better than those smaller parties (i.e. the Freedom Front and the PAC)
who did benefit from existing legislation regarding the State funding of political
parties.
When a focus is placed on the amounts political parties spent on their 1999 election
campaigns, one needs to consider who should be primarily responsible for financing
the election campaigns of political parties. The ANC is said to have spent more than
RI00 million from its own resources, the NNP spent in the region of R30 million on
its campaign activities, the DP more than R20 million, and the IFP spent more than
R30 million from its "own coffers" (Mail and Guardian, 5-11 March 1999). Current
financing legislation clearly does not benefit small parties, but lends itself to a
situation where the "strong becomes stronger" and the weak, being left to their own
devices, merely wither away. In abolishing the State funding of the election
campaigns of political parties, or rather those parties in parliament, only the "serious"
political parties will eventually compete in the electoral process.
5.4 DO NOT EXTEND VOTING RIGHTS TO PRISONERS:
After an initial decision not to allow prisoners to vote, 146 000 pnsoners were
eventually granted the right to cast their votes during the 1999 elections, of whom a
some 20% eventually cast their votes. This exercise, granting criminals the right to
vote, cost the taxpayer RIO million; money that could have spent on other more
pressing needs, such as voter education programmes.
The EC's objections that this step would further inflate its electoral budget were not
accepted by a Constitutional Court ruling in favour of the right of prisoners to vote.
The Court stated that neither the EC nor the Court itself had the right to disenfranchise
prisoners. According to the ruling, only Parliament had the power to do that, and
since Parliament had not sought in any way to do so, prisoners should be granted the
right to vote (Pottie, et al., 1999: 1-2).
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However, law-abiding citizens of the country who happened to be overseas on polling
day were denied the right to cast their vote and the implications of this de facto
disenfranchisement sparked a widespread debate regarding this matter. The implicit
contention was that convicted criminals were entitled to more rights than
economically active law-abiding citizens.
5.5 THE INTRODUCTION OF INTERNET VOTING:
The aim of this proposal is to make the process of voting a more convenient one and
also to encourage young voters (those aged between 18 and 30) to vote. This proposal
can be approached as a joint venture by government, big businesses and tertiary
education institutions. The excitement that will accompany such an invention would
serve as a bait, luring young adults to be part of the electoral process. Previous
indications showed that very few young adults cast their votes during the elections
(EISA, 1999). The time-consuming exercise of queuing at voting stations may have
been exciting in 1994, but it has since lost and will continue to lose much of its
"glamour" and appeal.
It should obviously not be forgotten that South Africa is a developing country, but this
should not serve as a debilitating factor en route to the introduction of internet voting.
If government can succeed in letting corporate South Africa buy into this venture, it
will prove to be a less costly affair in the long run and the possibilities for further
innovations are endless.
The USA is currently considering introducing Internet voting as a measure to increase
voter turnout in the elections (Blitzer, 1999). It is in particular aimed at that segment
of the American electorate that traditionally does not vote - the American youth. The
Pentagon is already in the process of developing a system that would enable oversees
military personnel to cast absentee ballots in the 2000 Presidential election.
Individual states such as California, Washington, Minnesota, Iowa and Florida are
currently also exploring the possibility of online voting.
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This idea has sparked a class debate in America. Critics, according to Blitzer (1999),
are concerned that online voting may skew an election by making it easier for some
groups (middle class, college educated males) to vote at the expense of others (low
income, working-class families). For Jim Adler, president of Vote here. net, this is the
least of his concerns. He firmly believes that just as television has spread to almost
every household in America, computers will soon follow suit.
The question of security is the most vital concern to critics of this proposal: whether
or not hackers, fraud, a computer virus or breakdown would be able to upset an
election? Supporters, however, are adamant that, given sound and proven computer
codes and encryption, special measures would ensure that each vote is secure. This
concern though, underlines once again the general scepticism that accompanies
technological advances. This sentiment is wonderfully captured by the Renaissance
statesman, Machiavelli (1961), in stating that "men are generally incredulous, never
really trusting new things unless they have trusted them by experience." This is a trait
that the authorities should entertain and deal with. Already, the introduction of
computer training courses in schools and community centres across South Africa,
frequently with the assistance of large business concerns, is contributing a great deal
to alleviating this sense of alienation towards technology.
It is obvious that there are many issues that need to be addressed and solved with
regard to internet voting. It is still an unexplored field and it seems certain that it
would spark some fierce class debate in South Africa. The greatest concern, however,
is how the youth of this country could be encouraged to become involved in the
governmental decision-making process. They are important actors in the political
process, as is evident by their numbers. Approximately 36% of all eligible voters in
South Africa fall within the 18-30 year old grouping. Their apathy towards the
political process was clearly illustrated by the low registration turnout for the 1999
elections. During the first round of registration only 28.6% of those aged between 18
and 30 registered to vote, whilst a mere 11.65% of those aged between 18 and 20
turned out to register (EISA, 1999).
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As to how many of those aged between 18 and 30 eventually cast their votes, is not
quite certain. In all fairness it should be borne in mind that the declining rate of
participation in the political process by young voters, is not a problem confined to
South Africa. According to Pottie, et al. (1999), comparative studies illustrate that the
declining rate of political participation among young voters is a worldwide
phenomenon. The onus nevertheless still lies with the political authorities to convince
young people to come out and cast their votes. The obvious advantages are that this
internet voting venture, if applied correctly, would be saving the country time and
money. The advancement in technology is also certain to render this a safe and secure
way of voting. To a great extent, it also eliminates the physical danger of intimidation
at the polling stations, and thereby making voting a physically safe endeavour.
To conclude, the above recommendations aim to be practical solutions to a pressing
problem for developing countries: too expensive elections. It is not aimed against any
particular group, but rather aimed at contributing to conducting free and fair elections
at a reduced price. These recommendations are obviously not the only ones that could
be implemented, for surely there are more areas in which the cost of elections could be
reduced. The above represents the start of concerted efforts to reduce the cost of the
election process.
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS:
Whatever the theoretical debates surrounding the importance of elections towards the
democratic system, they remain to be of paramount importance to democracy by
fulfilling the functions of:
• Recruiting politicians;
• Constituting governments in countries where the political executive is directly
elected, as in the USA and France. In parliamentary systems it influences the
formation of governments;
• Providing representation, and when they are fair and competitive, demands
from the public are channelled through to the government;
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• Influencing policy, especially in cases where a single issue dominates the
election campaign;
• Educating voters by providing the electorate with an abundance of
information on political parties, the political system, etc.;
• Building legitimacy by providing justification for a system of rule, whether it
is democratic or not and mobilising active consent through the fact that
citizens are participating in politics or encouraged to do so; and
• Strengthening elites by using elections as a vehicle to manipulate the masses,
and using it as a means to neutralise political discontent and opposition;
giving the people the impression that they are exercising power over the
government.
Democracy, however, entails more than just conducting free and fair elections, but it
cannot be less. Elections ultimately provide the opportunity for ordinary citizens to
express their support of, or dissatisfaction with the governing authorities. Elections,
in effect, lend a voice to the demands and wishes of the people.
The crucial role played by the respective electoral commissions in different countries
has also been recognised in this study. Their perceived or real bias towards the
political incumbents could be detrimental to democratic consolidation in newly
democratic countries. Electoral commissions are thus essential in lending legitimacy
to the whole electoral process. It is, therefore, of paramount importance that these
bodies function independently from government. It has also become clear that
methods need to be sought to secure the financial independence of these bodies from
the incumbent regime. To a considerable extent this would free these bodies from the
"mercy" of the governing authorities.
An important question mark needs to be placed as to the underlying reasons relating to
the high cost of the 1999 general South African election. The propositions quoted in
this paper hold that the high cost of an election could either be attributed to: (a) it is a
country's first experience with democratic elections or (b) the elections form part of a
broader peacekeeping operation. Therefore, one would have expected that the cost of
the 1999 elections would have been significantly less than the elections of 1994. It is
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apparent that bad electoral administration, especially on the part of the government
that was quite sluggish in appointing the new Electoral Commission, and also the
budgetary dispute between the Commission and the government, attributed
significantly to the relatively high cost of the elections. The time constraints meant
that the EC had to resort to costly technology in order to secure that the elections took
place on the scheduled date.
Whether government's tardiness in appointing EC Commissioners also reflects its
attitude towards elections is surely debatable. One could argue that this episode
signals the incumbents' confidence in their electoral strength, to the extent that a
matter such as the appointment of the EC was perceived as a mundane matter. Should
this be the case, then the implications for the future of a competitive electoral
democracy in South Africa would not appear to be good.
In thisstudy it has been established that:
• Free and fair elections are crucial in sustaining democracy, as they lend legitimacy
to both the governing authorities and the political system.
• Compared to most developing countries in the world, the South African elections
of 1999 were a very expensive undertaking.
• Better planning of the elections could have reduced the cost of the election.
• Where the majority of countries show a dramatic reduction in electoral
expenditure following their founding elections, the reverse holds true for South
Africa.
• The South African electoral authorities seriously need to evaluate appropriate and
inappropriate electoral expenditures.
• Most importantly, expensive elections are not synonymous with equal free and fair
ones.
The question regarding electoral expenditure in South Africa should also be viewed in
its broader socio-economic context. South Africa is a country marred by high levels
of crime and unemployment, a deteriorating health sector, and an equally troubled
education system. These issues need to be the government's first priority, because
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
84
they constitute the biggest threat to the country's democracy. At the moment, the
expectations on the one hand, and the experience on the other hand that many people
have of democracy are two contradictory experiences. As a consequence, when
pressing social issues are not properly attended to, these could easily open the door to
undemocratic forces.
Government is ultimately accountable for its actions and decisions to all its citizens,
both to those who voted it into power and to those who did not. Could any
government, therefore, justify spending millions of Rands on a single election when it
is faced with more pressing social and economic problems? The answer is an
unequivocal "no!"
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
1. BOOKS AND ARTICLES
Basanez, M. (1995) "Problems in interpreting electoral polls in authoritarian
countries: Lessons from the 1994 Mexican election", in International Social Science
Journal, Volume 47(4), December: pp. 643-650.
Bogdanor, V. (1984) What is Proportional Representation. Martin Robertson &
Company Ltd.: Oxford.
Bogdanor, V. and Butler, D. (1983) Democracy and Elections. Electoral systems
and their political consequences. Cambridge University Press: London.
Bratton, M. (1998) "After Mandela's Miracle in South Africa", in African Affairs,
Volume 97 : pp. 214-219.
Bratton, M. (1998) "Second Elections in Africa", In Journal of Democracy,
Volume 9(3) : pp. 51-66.
Breytenbach, W.I. (1996) Democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa: Transitions,
elections and prospects for consolidation. Africa Institute of South Africa: Pretoria.
Butler, D. and Penniman, H.R. and Ranney, A. (eds.) (1981) Democracy at the
Polls. A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections. American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington, D.C.
Capitanchik, D. (1996) "The Israeli General Elections of 1996 - Another
Upheaval?", in Government and Opposition, Volume 31(4), Autumn: pp. 449-466.
Centeno, M.A. (1994) Democracy Within Reason - Technocratic Revolution in
Mexico. The Pennsylvania State University Press: Pennsylvania.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
86
Chege, M. (1995) "Between Africa's Extremes", in Journal of Democracy, Volume
6(1), January: pp. 44.
Choe, Y. & Darnolf, S. (1999) "Evaluating the Structure and Functional Role of
Electoral Administration in Contemporary Democracies: Building 'Free and Fair
Election Index (FFE/)' and 'Effective Election Index (EEl) '. Paper prepared for
delivery at the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association
(APSA), Atlanta, 2-5 September 1999.
De Ville, J. & Steytler, N. (1996) Voting in 1999: Choosing an Electoral System.
Butterworths Publishing (Pty) Ltd: South Africa.
De Villiers, B. (1993) Electoral Procedures in Africa: Five Case Studies.
Guidelines for South Africa. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung: Johannesburg.
Donovan, M. (1996) "A Turning Point That Turned? The April 1996 General
Election in Italy", in West European Politics, Volume 19(4), October: pp. 805-813.
EISA. (1998) "lEC finances - the cupboard is bare", in EISA Election Update 99,
Number 2, November 27: p. 3.
EISA. (1999) "Political Parties Registration for Elections", III EISA Election
Update 99, Number 12, May 14: p. 1.
Faure, M. (1996) "The Electoral System", in Journal of Theoretical Politics,
Volume 8(2), April: pp. 193-208.
Ganguly, S. (1996) "Uncertain India", in Current History, Volume 95(600), April:
pp. 145-150.
Garfinkle, A. (1997) "Israel and Palestine: A Precarious Partnership", in The
Washington Quarterly, Volume 20(3), Summer: pp. 3-22.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
87
Gill, M.S. (1998) "India: Running the World's Biggest Elections", in Journal of
Democracy, Volume 9(1), January: pp. 163-168.
Gouws, A. (1996) "Intolerance in Kwa-Zulu Natal: Illustrating the Complexity of
Tolerance Attitudes", in Politikon, Volume 23(2), December: pp. 22-35.
Harrop, M. and Miller, W.L. (1987) Elections and Voters. A Comparative
Introduction. Macmillan Press Ltd: London.
Huntington, S.P. (1997) "After Twenty Years. The Future of The Third Wave", In
Journal of Democracy, Volume 8(4), October: pp. 3-12.
IEC (1994) Report of the Independent Electoral Commission: The South
African Elections of April 1994. Independent Electoral Commission: Johannesburg.
IEC (1999) Budget Summary 1999/2000.
Jarrett, I. (1998) "Australia", in Asia and Pacific Review 1998, Walden Publishing
Ltd: UK.
Jeffries, R. (1998) "The Ghanaian Elections of 1996: Towards the Consolidation of
Democracy?", in African Affairs, Volume 97 : pp. 189-208.
Jennings, M.K. and Zeigler, L.H. (1966) The Electoral Process. Prentice Hall, Inc.:
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.
Jones, B. (1999) "IEC", in EISA Election Update 99, Number 7, February 26:
p.3.
Jones, B. and Lodge, T. and Ntuli, S. (1999) "A roll fulfilled", in EISA Election
Update 99, Number 11, Apri130: pp. 1-2.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
88
Jones, B. and Lodge, T. and Ntuli, S. (1999) "IEC cash flows", in EISA Election
Update 99, Number 6, February 12 : pp. 4.
Karis, T.G. (1994) "A Small Miracle" Continues: South Africa, 1994-1999. The
Ralph Bunch Institute on the United Nations: New York.
Klingemann, H-D. and Hoffebert, R.l. and Budge, I. (1994) Parties, Policies, and
Democracy. Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado.
Kotzé, H.J. (2000) "The state and social change in South Africa", in International
Social Science Journal. Volume LIl (1), March: pp. 79-94.
La Botz, D. (1995) Democracy in Mexico. Peasant Rebellion and Political
Reform. South End Press: Boston.
LeDuc, L. and Niemi, R.G. and Norris, P. (eds.) (1996) Comparing Democracies.
Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. SAGE Publications, Inc.: London.
Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems. Oxford University Press
Inc.: New York.
Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (1984) Choosing an Electoral System. Issues and
Alternatives. Praeger Publishers: New York.
Lodge, T. (1995) "The South African general election, April 1994: results, analysis
and implications", in African Affairs, Volume 94(377), October: pp. 471-500.
Lodge, T. and Pottie, D. (1999) "Going, going, gone", in EISA Election Update
~ Number 5, January 29: pp. 15-18.
Lodge, T. (1999) "What sort ofIEC can we afford?", in EISA Election Update 99,
Number 5, January 29: pp. 18-19.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
89
Lopez-Pintor, R. (1999) Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of
Governance. IFES.
Lyons, T. (1998) "Liberia's Path from Anarchy to Elections", in African Affairs,
Volume 97 : pp. 229-233.
Machiavelli, N. (1961) The Prince. (Translated with an introduction by George
Bull) Penguin Books Ltd: London.
Macridis, R.C. and Burg, S.L. (1991) Introduction to Comparative Politics
Regimes and Change. Harper Collins Publishers: New York.
Mattes, R. and Thiel, H. (1998) "Consolidation and Public Opinion in South
Africa", in Journal of Democracy, Volume 9(1), January: pp. 95-111.
Mattes, R. (1995) The Election Book. Judgement and Choice in SA's 1994
Elections. Idasa Public Information Service: Cape Town.
Mehta, P.B. (1997) "India: Fragmentation Amid Consensus", In Journal of
Democracy, Volume 8(1), January: pp. 56-69.
Meredith, M. (1994) South Africa's New Era: The 1994 Elections. Mandarin
Paperbacks: Great Britain.
Moller, V. and Hanf, T. (1995) Learning to Vote. Indicator Press: Durban.
NDL (1998) The Public Funding Of Political Parties. An International
Comparative Study. The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs:
South Africa.
Pastor, R. (1998) "Mediating Elections", in Journal of Democracy, Volume 9(1),
January: pp. 154-163.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
90
Pastor, R. (1999) "The Role of Electoral Administration in Democratic Transitions:
Implications for Policy Research." (Article forthcoming in Democratization, Volume
6(4), Winter 1999/2000.)
Peretz, D. and Doron, G. (1997) The Government and Politics of Israel.
Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado.
Plattner, M.F. (1998) "Liberalism and Democracy. Can't Have One Without The
Other", in Foreign Affairs, Volume 77(2), March/April: pp. 171-180.
Pottie, D. (1999) "The politics of money: funding political parties", in EISA
Election Update 99, Number 9, March 26: pp. 21-24.
President's Council. (1992) Report of the Committee for Constitutional Affairs
on the Desirability and, if necessary, the Scope of an Ethical Code of Conduct or
Statutory Framework for the Functioning of South African Political Parties in
Terms of Commonly Prevailing Democratic Norms and Guide-Lines.
Government Printer: Cape Town.
Pridham, G. (ed.) (1990) Securing Democracy. Political Parties and Democratic
Consolidation in Southern Europe. Routledge: New York.
Radu, M. (1997) "The Looming Mexican Crisis", in The Washington Quarterly,
Volume 20(4), Autumn: pp. 117-127.
Randall, V. (ed.) (1988) Political Parties in the Third World. SAGE Publications:
London.
Reeve, A. and Ware, A. (1992) Electoral Systems: a comparative and theoretical
introduction. Routledge: London & New York.
Reynold, A. (ed.) (1994) Election '94 South Africa. David Philip Publishers: South
Africa.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
91
Reynold, A. and Reilly, B. (1997) The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral
Design. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Stockholm,
Sweden.
Roberts, G.K. (1986) An Introduction to Comparative Politics. Edward Arnold
Ltd: Great Britain.
Rokkan, S. (1970) Citizens Elections Parties. David McKay Company, Inc.:
Denmark.
Sarmiento, S. (1997) "The Inevitable Transformation", III The Washington
Quarterly, Volume 20(4), Autumn: pp. 129-139.
Thakur, R. (1995) The Government and Politics of India. Macmillan Press Ltd:
London.
Thuetsad, A.B. and Selch, C. (1998) "What do we mean by free and fair
elections?", in EISA Election Update 99, Number 2, November 27: pp. 7-10.
Ware, A. (ed.) (1987) Political Parties. Electoral Change and Structural
Response. Basil Blackwell Ltd: Oxford, UK.
Weintraub, S. (1997) "The Complex Situation that is Mexico", in The Washington
Quarterly, Volume 20(4), Autumn: pp. 89-102.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
92
2. NEWSPAPERS
"Bam volg Kriegler op as OVK leier", in Die Burger, 20 Februarie: p. 2.
Barrell, H. (1999) "SA voters cost R1000 each", m Mail & Guardian,
5 -11 March: pA.
Barrell, H. and Soggot, M. (1999) "Secret Mandela offer overturned by ANC", in
Mail & Guardian, 29 January- 4 February: p. 2-3.
"Behind the scenes support was crucial for efficiency", in The Star, 11 June: p. 14.
Bezuidenhout, N. (1999) "OVK bestuur Eleksie van Pta-skouterrein", in Beeld,
20 May: p. 12.
Bonorchis, R. (1999) "Zip-zips will put zap into voting", m The Sunday
Independent, 30 May: p. 11.
Bonorchis, R. (1998) "ICL's scanning system beats the voting blues", in Sunday
Independent, 29 November: p. 3.
De Bruin, P. (1999) '''n Menslike, sagte heer", in Beeld, 30 January: p. 3.
Eybers, J. (1999) "25 000 zip-zip masjientjies was nodig", in Die Volksblad, 21
May: p. 4.
Granelli, M. (1999) "Hall J at showgrounds goes hi-tech for poll", in Pretoria News,
20 May: p. 3.
"Long slog for election officers and their zip-zips", in Eastern Province Herald, 25
May: p. 5.
"Mandela rapped over appointment oflEC boss", in Cape Argus, 22 February: p.2.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
93
Mdhlela, J. (1999) "Mchunu has right skills for electoral job", in Sowetan, 29
January: p. 15.
Montgomery, C. (1999) "Bewerings van nepotisme binne die OVK ontken", in Die
Volksblad, 27 March: p. 4.
Mvoko, V. (1998) "Electoral commission has not yet hired staff', in Business Day,
26 March: p. 4.
Mvoko, V. (1998) "lEC finally gets green light to hire officials", in Business Day,
6 April: pp. 1-2.
Naidu, E. (1999) "Electoral appointment angers DP and Nats", in The Star, 22
February: p. 3.
Nyatsumba, K. (1999) "Let's give ourselves a pat on the back", in The Cape Times,
9 June: p. 15.
O'Grady, K. (1999) "220 000 will be paid to man polls", in Business Day, 7 May:
p. 1.
"Party Funding" (1999), in The Citizen, 19 March.
"Satellite problem plays havoc with lEC's polling plans", in Eastern Province
Herald, 1 June: p. 8.
Shapshak, D. (1999) "It's not a rocket launch, it's the election", m Mail &
Guardian, 4-10 June: p. 22.
"Streekstelsel kan uitslae vertraag", in Beeld, 2 June: p. 2.
"Stringent security as ballot papers are printed", in Pretoria News, 20 May: p. 6.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
94
Sulcas, A. (1999) "No cheap seats in a democracy at R175 a voter", in The Sunday
Independent, 6 June: p. 4.
"The complex process of choosing a successor", in The Star, 27 January: p. 1.
Verster, I. (1999) "OVK se dr. Bam 'n waardige moeder owerste", in Die Volksblad,
19 May: p. 7.
3. INTERNET
Barrell, H. (1999) "Your moment at the polls will cost RIOaa", in Daily Mail &
Guardian (online edition). (1 September 2000) Available at:
<http://www.mg.co.zalmg/news/99mar 1/5mar-elections.html>
Blitzer, W. (1999) "Internet revolution pushing way into voting booth", in eNN
(online edition). (24 November 1999) Available at:
<http://cnn.comJ ALLPOLITICS/storiesI1999/ 11l03/net.voting.html:::_
CSIS (1994) "Mexico: Prognosis for Stability" (5 December 1999) Available at:
<http:www.mexicochannel.net/cgi-bin.html>
Documents on Mexican Politics. (1998) "1994 Presidential and Legislative
Elections" (6 December 1999), Available at:
<http://vvww.cs.unb.ca/~alopez-o/politics/resultados.html>
Electoral Commission of India (1998) "Indian Elections" (11 August 1999),
Available at: <http://www.eci.gov.in/infoeci/elec_sys/index.htm:::_
Farnsworth, M. (1997) "1996 Australian Federal Election Costs" (17 August 1999),
Available at: <http://vcepolitics.com/vote/1996/96cost.htm:::_
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95
Hamby, M. (1999) "Toward an Independent Commission", in Elections Today,
Volume 6(2), (online edition) (13 December 1999), Available at:
~http://wwwjfes.org.newsletter/v6n2c.htm::::.
IEC (1999) "National Results" (26 November 1999), Available at:
~http://wvvw.elections.org.za/results/results _frames.htmlg
ICL (1998) "Mexico Index" (6 December 1999), Available at:
~http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/mx_indx.html::::.
IFES, UN-DESA and IDEA (1999) "Administration and Cost of Elections Project"
(6 May 1999), Available at: <http://www.aceproject.org/mainlenglish/default.htm~
International IDEA (1999) "India" (9September 1999), Available at:
~http://w-v.'W.idea.int/publications/ esd -india.htmlg
Lindvall-Larson, K. (1996) "Mexico" (16 September 1999), Available at:
~http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/las/mexico/intromex.html::::,
Smith, G.R. (1998) "ACE Project Electoral Management: Costs" (17 September
1999), Available at: <http://www.aceproject.org/default.htm>
State of Israel, The (1999) "Elections in Israel May 1996" (30 August 1999),
Available at: <http://wvvw.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MF AI-IO1fsO::::,
State of Israel, The (1998) "The Electoral System in Israel" (4 August 1999),
Available at: <http://wvvw.kncsset.gov.il/kncssetlknes/eng_mimshal_bch.htm::::.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
96
4. INTERVIEWS
Interview conducted with David Pottie, from EISA, on the 6th of July 1999 lil
Johannesburg.
Interview conducted with Deon Du Plooy, from the lEe, on the ih of July 1999 in
Pretoria.
Interview conducted (electronic mail exchange) with Joe Baxter, from IFES, on the 6th
of September 1999.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
